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ABSTRACT 
Netflix, Amazon, YouTube, and Apple have been joined by Disney+, Twitch, 
Facebook, and others to supplant the broadcast industry.  As the FCC, FTC, and other 
regulators struggle, a new digital divide has emerged.  The current regulatory regime 
for television is built upon the government’s right to manage over-the-air 
broadcasting.  As content producers shift away from broadcast and cable, much of 
the government’s regulatory control will end, resulting in new consequences for 
public policy and new challenges involving privacy, advertising, and antitrust law.  
Despite the technological change, there are compelling government interests in 
a healthy media environment.  This article explores the constitutionally valid 
approaches available to discourage discrimination and digital redlining and instead 
promote the public interest embodied in the Communications Act.  Even as broadcast 
regulation fades away many of the goals should be pursued, including the promotion 
of diversity of viewpoint, access to news and educational content, and the fostering 
of cultural content for those without the financial resources to buy broadband access.  
In addition, the tracking technologies inherent in online media create a compelling 
need to protect from the heightened risks to personal privacy.  The article calls upon 
the FTC to become the lead regulator, enforcing the Sherman Act, Clayton Act, and 
the FTC Act’s provisions to assure that competition, online advertising, customer 
privacy, and the public interest are rigorously enforced. 
INTRODUCTION 
The global entertainment and media industries now exceed two trillion dollars 
in annual revenue, with the majority of that revenue generated by digital content.1  
Despite its size, however, the economic impact is secondary to the power of these 
industries to shape political thought, religious faith, and cultural norms across 
society.2  Moreover, modern digital media includes both commercial content 
producers and a multitude of platforms enabling direct, person-to-person media 
interactions that shape social media, political thought, and public discourse.  Each of 
these modalities is distinct, but they overlap in a multitude of ways, challenging 
regulators and frustrating public policy agendas. 
For over a century, Congress has struggled to balance public policy 
considerations and technical regulations with a multitude of legal, cultural, and 
economic challenges inherent to media and broadcasting.  The origins of these efforts 
began with the Copyright Act of 1909 and the Radio Act of 1912.  While the 
Copyright Act was not wholly revised until 1976, the Radio Act lasted only until 
                                                                                                     
 1.  PWC, PERSPECTIVES FROM THE GLOBAL ENTERTAINMENT & MEDIA OUTLOOK 2019-2023, 
GETTING PERSONAL: PUTTING THE ME IN ENTERTAINMENT AND MEDIA (2019), https://www.pwc.com/gx 
/en/entertainment-media/outlook-2019/entertainment-and-media-outlook-perspectives-2019-2023.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K8LF-REX9]. 
 2.  See, e.g., STIG HJARVARD, THE MEDIATIZATION OF CULTURE AND SOCIETY (2013); RONALD 
INGLEHART, MODERNIZATION AND POSTMODERNIZATION: CULTURAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL 
CHANGE IN 43 SOCIETIES 70 (1997) (“[A] broad syndrome of changes has been linked with modern 
economic development.  These changes include urbanization, industrialization, occupational 
specialization, mass formal education, development of mass media, secularization, individuation, the 
rise of entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial motivations, bureaucratization, the mass production assembly 
line, and the emergence of the modern state.”). 
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1927.  
The development of the Internet, social media, and mobile telecommunications 
technology has significantly increased these challenges.  Governments face demands 
to regulate new technologies, manage the broadcast spectrum, control 
anticompetitive behavior, protect consumers, increase privacy, discourage tobacco 
use, police advertising, and foster the public good.  And unlike much of the world, 
in the United States, these goals are further constrained by a constitutional imperative 
to “make no law . . .  abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”3 
Largely unnoticed in the growth of digital distribution services for entertainment 
and media content has been the diminution of AM, FM, and UHF broadcasting as a 
structural component of public media consumption. As digitization continues, the 
use of analog digital airwaves is beginning to fade away. With the demise of over-
the-air broadcasting, much of the Federal Communication Commission’s (FCC) 
jurisdiction will disappear as well. 
This article addresses the transition from a broadcast-based regulatory model to 
its alternative. The article will also address some of the implications for 
entertainment and media producers and for content publicly produced. 
I. THE RISE OF FEDERAL MEDIA REGULATION 
By 1901, Marchese Guglielmo Marconi had transformed Heinrich Hertz’s radio 
experiments into successful point-to-point wireless communications.4  Radio was 
moved under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Navy because of its military importance5 
and the need to safeguard commercial shipping.6  The initial regulation was the 
Wireless Ship Act of 1910,7 but that was quickly supplanted.  The Radio Act of 1912 
moved jurisdiction to the Department of Commerce and Labor, added provisions 
regarding foreign ownership, and included many specific regulations regarding the 
airwaves directly into the text of the Act.8 
“By 1912, the U.S. subsidiary of the Marconi Wireless Telegraph Company, the 
Marconi Company of America, controlled nearly all civilian maritime wireless 
communications from shore stations in the United States and handled most of the 
nation’s other commercial wireless traffic.”9 However, Marconi’s technology was 
                                                                                                     
 3.  U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 
1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 263 (1961) (“In my view, ‘the people need free speech’ because they have 
decided, in adopting, maintaining, and interpreting their Constitution, to govern themselves rather than 
to be governed by others.”). 
 4.  HUGH R. SLOTTEN, RADIO AND TELEVISION REGULATION: BROADCAST TECHNOLOGY IN THE 
UNITED STATES, 1920–1960, at 3 (2000). 
 5.  Rita Zajacz, Liberating American Communications: Foreign Ownership Regulations from the 
Radio Act of 1912 to the Radio Act of 1927, 48 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 157, 163 (2004). 
 6.  See Daniel D. Hoolihan, Titanic, Marconi’s “Wireless Telegraphers” and the U. S. Radio Act 
of 1912, 5 IEEE ELECTROMAGNETIC COMPATIBILITY MAG. 35, 37 (2016) (“As a result of the Titanic’s 
disaster and the subsequent congressional investigation, the U. S. Government passed the Radio Act of 
1912.”). 
 7.  Wireless Ship Act of 1910, ch. 262, 36 Stat. 629 (1910) (amended 1912). 
 8.  See Radio Act of 1912, ch. 287, 37 Stat. 302, repealed by Radio Act of 1927, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 
1162. 
 9.  SLOTTEN, supra note 4, at 3. 
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crude,10 and each point-to-point transmission created significant radio interference 
for other broadcasters.  American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T or the Bell 
System) and General Electric (GE) were both competing to patent more efficient 
technologies.11  Marconi Company of America was forced to withdraw from the 
United States in the face of governmental concerns regarding foreign ownership of 
radio and pressure to Americanize the technology with the advent of World War I.12  
Encouraged by the War Department, GE acquired Marconi Company of America 
and launched the Radio Corporation of America (RCA).13  Joined by Westinghouse 
and United Fruit Company, this emerging group of radio, telephony, and technology 
companies entered into patent licensing and economic agreements that segregated 
and promoted the growth of the radio industry, wireless telephone industry, and 
equipment manufacturing.14  The heart of this arrangement was President Woodrow 
Wilson’s view that global “pre-eminence would be determined by three factors:  oil, 
transportation, and communication.  The United States was predominant in oil, but 
Britain could not be challenged in transportation or cable communications.”15  If the 
United States could capture the wireless communications industry, it could split 
communications with Britain, resulting in “a standoff between the two powers.”16  
During this same post-war period, the Department of Commerce’s role began to 
change as technology continued to develop. For example, “[t]he war accelerated the 
development of the art [of radio frequencies] . . . and in 1921 the first standard 
broadcast stations were established.  They grew rapidly in number, and by 1923 there 
were several hundred such stations throughout the country.”17 
Furthermore, Herbert Hoover took over the department in 1921 and transformed 
it into a regulatory powerhouse that focused on helping businesses, establishing 
standardization, and promoting the economy.18  The emerging broadcast industry 
                                                                                                     
 10.  Id. (“Spark transmitters generated radio frequency signals as byproducts of electromagnetic 
sparking across induction coils. . . . Tuning to one frequency was difficult, interference among 
transmitters was a major problem, and the technology was not entirely satisfactory for voice 
transmission, or telephony.”).  
 11.  Id. 
 12.  See MARC RABOY, MARCONI: THE MAN WHO NETWORKED THE WORLD 443-44 (2016) (“RCA 
took over British Marconi’s interest in its American subsidiary, including the right to use Marconi’s 
patents in the United States. . . . RCA took over not only the American Marconi patents, but also 
Marconi’s high-power stations . . . and Marconi’s 37.5 percent interest in the Pan-American Wireless 
Telegraph and Telephone Company.”); W. J. BAKER, A HISTORY OF THE MARCONI COMPANY 1974-
1965, at 181 (1970) (“American Marconi Company . . . had no alternative therefor but to discuss terms 
and eventually agree to the sale of its holdings.  Thus, on 17 October 1919, the Radio Corporation of 
America came into being.”). 
 13.  See ROBERT CAMPBELL, THE GOLDEN YEARS OF BROADCASTING: A CELEBRATION OF THE 
FIRST 50 YEARS OF RADIO AND TV ON NBC 50 (1976). 
 14.  See SLOTTEN, supra note 4, at 5; MICHELE HILMES, ONLY CONNECT 43 (4th ed. 2013) 
(“Westinghouse and the American Telephone and Telegraph Corporation [AT&T] became part of RCA 
in 1920.  In 1921 the United Fruit Company became a minor partner, because of its involvement in radio 
communication in its fruit shipping.”). 
 15.  RABOY, supra note 12, at 441. 
 16.  Id.  
 17.  Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 210-11 (1943). 
 18.  ANTHONY RUDEL, HELLO, EVERYBODY! THE DAWN OF AMERICAN RADIO 40 (2008). 
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became one of Hoover’s areas of focus.19  Nonetheless, the aggressive control 
Hoover sought to impose on the fledgling radio industry was met with legal 
challenges to his plenary authority.20  
The radio industry grew at unprecedented speed.  In 1922, five radio stations 
were on the air, but by the next year, the number had increased to 556.21  Because of 
previous antitrust concerns involving the Bell System, AT&T elected to relinquish 
its efforts at public radio broadcasting to continue its focus—and monopoly—on 
both wired telephony and wireless telegraphy for point-to-point communication.22  
By 1926, the business of telephony had split from the fledgling radio broadcasting 
industry.  AT&T sold its two radio stations to RCA along with all network 
operations.23  RCA used the assets to create the National Broadcasting Company 
(NBC) through a partnership with GE.  
The Commerce Secretary faced a series of defeats to his control over the 
increasingly rapid demand for broadcast licenses.24  With decisions in 1926 from 
both the courts and the Acting Attorney General turning against Hoover’s use of the 
Radio Act of 1912, something had to be done.  The frustrations of Secretary Hoover, 
the rapid expansion of broadcast radio, and the market power of RCA and NBC to 
reach across America created the force necessary for a new regulation of the 
airwaves. 
The Radio Act of 1927 moved regulation of radio away from the Department of 
Commerce to a new, freestanding organization, the Federal Radio Commission 
(FRC).25  In response to the limitation of the Radio Act of 1912 and the ministerial 
view of the legislation upheld in Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co.,26 Congress included 
judicial review of broadcast licenses27 in the Act, but the courts subsequently limited 
the extent of that authority.28  Congress also introduced the bases for broadcast 
                                                                                                     
 19.  Id. at 41 (“[L]isteners . . . found [that] the constant static made listening difficult, [so] radio in 
1921 was an ideal candidate for government intervention and Hoover’s brand of organization.”). 
 20.  See, e.g., Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co., 286 F. 1003, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (“In the present 
case the duty of naming a wave length is mandatory upon the Secretary.  The only discretionary act is in 
selecting a wave length, within the limitations prescribed in the statute, which, in his judgment, will 
result in the least possible interference.”). 
 21.  Robert Gobetz, Communications Act of 1934, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, https://www. 
britannica.com/event/Communications-Act-of-1934 [https://perma.cc/SCV2-VUNG] (last visited Dec. 
17, 2020). 
 22.  See FCC, INVESTIGATION OF THE TELEPHONE INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES 230 (1939); 1 
PETER W. HUBER ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW § 1.3.3 (2d ed. 1999 & Supp. 2014). 
 23.  100 Years, A Visual Memoir of RCA, RADIO CORP. OF AMERICA, https://www.rca.com/us_en 
/our-legacy-266-us-en [https://perma.cc/Q7QS-H547] (last visited Nov. 24, 2020). 
 24.  See United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F.2d 614 (N.D. Ill. 1926); Fed. Regul. of Radio 
Broad., 35 Op. Att’y Gen. 126, 127 (1926), 1926 U.S. AG LEXIS 7, at *8; Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United 
States, 319 U.S. 190, 212 (1943) (“[O]pinion of Acting Attorney General Donovan [stated] that the 
Secretary of Commerce had no power, under the Radio Act of 1912, to regulate the power, frequency or 
hours of operation of stations.” (citing Fed. Regul. of Radio Broad., 35 Op. Att’y Gen. 126)). 
 25.  Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, § 3, 44 Stat. 1162, 1162, repealed by Communications Act of 
1934, ch. 652, §1, 48. Stat. 1064, 1064.  
 26.  Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co., 286 F. 1003, 1006-07 (D.C. Cir. 1923).  
 27.  Radio Act of 1927 § 16. 
 28.  Fed. Radio Comm’n v. Gen. Elec. Co., 281 U.S. 464, 466-67 (1930) (providing that a de novo 
trial would violate the principle of separation of powers if held for the purpose of determining whether a 
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licenses to be granted, including where “public convenience, interest, or necessity” 
will be served.29  
The Radio Act of 1927 also reinforced the separation between telephony and 
radio.  In this way, the regulation reflected the structural approach to radio and 
telephone that the Bell System and RCA had negotiated through their cross-licensing 
arrangements.  RCA, with its NBC network of broadcasting stations, would control 
the airwaves, while the Bell System would maintain a monopoly over telephones and 
the nation’s telecommunications grid.30  The Radio Act “forbade cross-ownership of 
telephone companies and broadcasting stations and flatly rejected the operation of 
radio stations as ‘common carriers.’”31 
These changes, along with rules for telephony and common carriage, were then 
updated and combined into the Communications Act of 1934, which established the 
regulatory regime for the next half century.32  As described by the Department of 
Justice, the Communications Act was  
an expansive statute regulating U.S. telephone, telegraph, television, and radio 
communications.  Its seven subchapters regulate virtually all aspects of the 
communications and broadcasting industry, including assignment of frequencies, 
rates and fees, standards, competition, terms of subscriber access, commercials, 
broadcasting in the public interest, government use of communications systems.  
The Act also provides for more detailed regulation and oversight via the 
establishment of the FCC.33 
The transition from the Radio Act of 1927 to the Communications Act of 1934 
was part of the broader efforts of President Franklin Roosevelt to create a permanent 
body to replace the FRC and incorporate interstate telephone and telegraph 
regulation as common carriers into the newly formed FCC, rather than the 
Department of Commerce.34 
For radio, and television when it began to broadcast after World War II, the 
fundamental issue was what Congress meant by the public interest, convenience, and 
necessity.35 
Writing in 1930, Louis G. Caldwell, the former General Counsel of the FRC, 
explained the meaning behind the language as he understood it when first adopted 
into the Radio Act: 
 Instead of telling the Commission to do the best it can, however, Congress has done 
                                                                                                     
license should issue, since that role would create in the courts a licensing function which is legislative in 
character). 
 29.  Radio Act of 1927 § 4. 
 30.  HUBER ET AL., supra note 22, at 1-19 (“The Radio Act of 1927 sealed the deal.  It reaffirmed 
the general prohibition of ‘monopoly’ of the airwaves—meaning that competition over the airwaves was 
prohibited, at least if it came from Bell.”). 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (current version at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151 to 
646). 
 33.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., Privacy and Civil Liberty, The Communications Act of 1934, JUST. INFO. 
SHARING, http://it.ojp.gov/PrivacyLiberty/authorities/statutes/1288 [https://perma.cc/KK2R-HRRW] 
(Nov. 27, 2013). 
 34.  Communications Act of 1934 § 4. 
 35.  See Communications Act of 1934 §§ 4, 214, 303, 307, 309, 312, 319. 
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virtually the same thing by instructing it that all its acts must meet the standard of 
“public interest, convenience or necessity” . . . . “Public interest, convenience or 
necessity” means about as little as any phrase that the drafters of the Act could have 
used and still comply with the constitutional requirement that there be some standard 
to guide the administrative wisdom of the licensing authority.36 
Caldwell did not put much value in the phrase, pointing out that the terms were 
generally associated with state and federal licensing commissions to help rationalize 
the basis on which utility monopolies and other government grants were 
apportioned.37  He further noted, however, that “as a matter of history . . . each of the 
four National Radio Conferences called, and presided over, by President Hoover 
when Secretary of Commerce, emphasized the interest of the listening public as the 
paramount consideration in the regulation of broadcasting.”38  Section 9 of the Radio 
Act emphasized the need to give “fair, efficient and equitable radio service” among 
the states and the communities within the states.39 
The use of the public interest, convenience, and necessity standard was 
incorporated without change into the Communications Act of 1934 and continued to 
have little structural impact on the provision of radio licenses. 
II. CONTENT REGULATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT  
One of the challenges to understanding the public interest, convenience, and 
necessity standard stems from its intersection with the prohibitions of the First 
Amendment.  For broadcasting, it is reasonable to assume that neither Congress nor 
the courts considered the First Amendment to be directly applicable at the time of 
the legislative enactment in 1927 or 1934.  
A. Early Cases Rejecting the First Amendment 
In 1915, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the scope of the First Amendment 
with regard to motion pictures and theatrical productions.  In Mutual Film Corp. v. 
Industrial Commission of Ohio,40 the Court rejected the limitation of the state 
constitution on the power of the state to censor motion pictures or to restrict the 
issuance of licenses.41  Although based on Ohio law, the constitutional protection in 
question provided that “no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of 
speech, or of the press.”42  Instead, the Court rejected the spectacle of film as within 
the ambit of protected speech.  
                                                                                                     
 36.  Louis G. Caldwell, The Standard of Public Interest, Convenience or Necessity as Used in the 
Radio Act of 1927, 1 AIR L. REV. 295, 296 (1930) (“The underlying theory is, however, perfectly sound; 
only an indefinite and very elastic standard should be prescribed for the regulation of an art and a field 
of human endeavor which is progressing and changing at so rapid a pace as is radio communication.”). 
 37.  Id. at 303-06 (“‘This phrase, “common convenience and necessity,” has no legal meaning 
except when used to indicate a public necessity which justifies some act affecting the rights of person or 
property which would not be justifiable if that necessity did not exist.’” (quoting In re Shelton St. Ry. 
Co., 38 A. 362, 363 (Conn. 1897))). 
 38.  Id. at 324. 
 39.  Id. at 324-25 (quoting Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, § 9, 44 Stat. 1162, 1166 (repealed 1934)). 
 40.  236 U.S. 230 (1915). 
 41.  Id. at 244. 
 42.  Id. at 239 n.1. 
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 [T]he argument is wrong or strained which extends the guaranties of free opinion 
and speech to the multitudinous shows which are advertised on the billboards of our 
cities and towns . . . and which seeks to bring motion pictures and other spectacle 
into practical and legal similitude to a free press and liberty of opinion.43 
Once the Radio Act was passed, there were specific provisions relevant to 
speech regulation.  Section 29 provided that “[n]o person within the jurisdiction of 
the United States shall utter any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of 
radio communication.”44 
In Duncan v. United States,45 the Ninth Circuit upheld an early criminal 
conviction for violation of section 29, finding the broadcaster used vulgar and 
profane language to attack certain local politicians.46  The opinion reviewed the 
extent to which the Tenth Amendment governed the authority of the federal 
government to restrict the criminal prosecution to the states but never addressed 
either the Free Speech Clause or the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.  
Instead, the court found a sufficient basis for a criminal conviction.  The opinion 
explained that “the indictment having alleged that the language is profane, the 
defendant having referred to an individual as ‘damned,’ having used the expression 
‘By God’ irreverently, and having announced his intention to call down the curse of 
God upon certain individuals,” was sufficient under the statute to uphold the 
conviction for violating the statutory injunction against the use of profane language 
in radio broadcasting.47 
The First Amendment was directly addressed in Trinity Methodist Church, 
South v. Federal Radio Commission.48  The Reverend Doctor Robert Shuler was a 
firebrand evangelist who operated the radio station KGEF (Keep God Ever First), 
broadcasting “sensational rather than instructive” content.49  He had twice been 
convicted of attempting to obstruct justice using his broadcasts.50 
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit noted 
the shift in First Amendment jurisprudence away from allowing any form of prior 
restraint,51 but the court distinguished the exercise of a prior restraint to enjoin a 
publication or broadcast from the regulatory function of the FCC to grant or withhold 
license renewals.  
                                                                                                     
 43.  Id. at 243-44. The Court continued in its condemnation:  
[T]he exhibition of moving pictures is a business, pure and simple, originated and 
conducted for profit, like other spectacles, not to be regarded, nor intended to be regarded 
by the Ohio Constitution, we think, as part of the press of the country or as organs of public 
opinion.  They are mere representations of events, of ideas and sentiments published and 
known, vivid, useful, and entertaining, no doubt, but, as we have said, capable of evil, 
having power for it, the greater because of their attractiveness and manner of exhibition. 
Id. at 244. 
 44.  Radio Act of 1927 § 29. 
 45.  48 F.2d 128, 134 (9th Cir. 1931). 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id.  
 48.  62 F.2d 850, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1932). 
 49.  Id. at 851.  
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id. (“[T]he universal trend of decisions has recognized the guaranty of the amendment to 
prevent previous restraints upon publications, as well as immunity of censorship, leaving to correction 
by subsequent punishment those utterances or publications contrary to the public welfare.”). 
2020] DYSREGULATING THE MEDIA 53 
 But this does not mean that the government, through agencies established by 
Congress, may not refuse a renewal of license to one who has abused it to broadcast 
defamatory and untrue matter.  In that case there is not a denial of the freedom of 
speech, but merely the application of the regulatory power of Congress in a field 
within the scope of its legislative authority.52 
The court was again clear to distinguish between censorship and “the legitimate 
exercise of governmental powers for the public good.”53  “This is neither censorship 
nor previous restraint, nor is it a whittling away of the rights guaranteed by the First 
Amendment, or an impairment of their free exercise.”54 
Though Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson55 was decided between the adoption of 
the Radio Act and the Communications Act, the statutory authority of the law also 
mirrored the distinction made by the court in Trinity Methodist Church, South.  
Congress did not give statutory authority to censor radio communication or signals, 
but it did give the FRC and later the FCC the power to issue licenses, and Congress 
gave the Justice Department the authority to bring criminal actions for violation of 
the law barring the broadcast of “any obscene, indecent, or profane language.”56 
B. Introducing the Application of the First Amendment 
The recognition that the First Amendment applied to radio was made by the 
Supreme Court in its 1943 decision, National Broadcasting Co. v. United States,57 
where the Court acknowledged that Congress could violate the First Amendment in 
its efforts to regulate broadcasting.  The Court explained that had Congress 
authorized the FCC “to choose among applicants upon the basis of their political, 
economic or social views, or upon any other capricious basis,” then there could be a 
constitutional challenge.58 
The Court did not go any further to develop how the Communications Act might 
run afoul of the First Amendment, since it found “the unique characteristics of radio” 
made regulation of the airwaves necessary.  “Unlike other modes of expression, radio 
inherently is not available to all.   That is its unique characteristic, and that is why, 
unlike other modes of expression, it is subject to governmental regulation.  Because 
it cannot be used by all, some who wish to use it must be denied.”59  The Court relied 
on the “cannot be used by all”—a precursor of scarcity of the airwaves—to affirm 
the general approach of Congress and uphold the statutory framework of granting 
broadcasting licenses in the public interest.60 
In National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, the issue was whether NBC-
affiliated stations could be denied broadcast licenses because their programming was 
                                                                                                     
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. at 853. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
 56.  Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, § 29, 44 Stat. 1162, 1173, repealed by Communications Act of 
1934, ch. 652, § 326, 48. Stat. 1064, 1091. 
 57.  319 U.S. 190 (1943). 
 58.  Id. at 226 (“If it did, or if the Commission by these Regulations proposed a choice among 
applicants upon some such basis, the issue before us would be wholly different.”). 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  See id. at 226-27. 
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distributed as “chain broadcasting.”61  The Communications Act defined “chain 
broadcasting” as “simultaneous broadcasting of an identical program by two or more 
connected stations.”62  NBC would transmit its content to its owned and affiliated 
stations on the Bell System’s leased telephone wires for its stations to air 
simultaneously across the country.  This was how the networks originally operated.  
In 1940, the FCC began a comprehensive effort to review the chain broadcasting 
problem and the dominance that RCA’s NBC had established across national 
broadcasting.63  NBC operated the Red and Blue networks, with a total of 135 
stations.  CBS was second in the country with 113 stations.64  Programmatically, 
NBC dominated the market with the most popular performers and shows.  Only when 
the networks began rolling out television was CBS able to become a true competitor 
to NBC.65  The NBC alliance also fueled other monopoly concerns, since RCA 
“continued to be the world’s largest distributor of radios, which were made by [NBC 
co-owners] Westinghouse and General Electric.”66 
The dominance of NBC and the growing power of CBS left broadcasters, such 
as the Mutual Broadcasting Company, locked out of some geographic markets.  
When Mutual had exclusive broadcasting rights to the 1939 baseball World Series, 
parts of the country were unable to listen to the broadcast because only NBC and 
CBS stations serviced their markets.67  Blocking access to the World Series was too 
much for Congress. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the findings of the FCC regarding the monopoly 
concerns of radio licensing.  
A licensee station does not operate in the public interest when it enters into exclusive 
arrangements which prevent it from giving the public the best service of which it is 
capable, and which, by closing the door of opportunity in the network field, 
adversely affect the program structure of the entire industry.68  
The result of the decision allowed the FCC to force NBC to divest itself of one 
of its networks.   It ultimately sold off the Blue Network, which became the American 
Broadcast Company (ABC).69   The decision also upheld a series of extensive 
                                                                                                     
 61.  Id. at 193-94. 
 62.  Id. at 194 n.1 (quoting Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 3(p), 48 Stat. 1064, 1066 
(current version at 47 U.S.C. § 153(10) (2018)). 
 63.  See FCC, REPORT ON CHAIN BROADCASTING 8 (1941) [hereinafter CHAIN BROADCASTING 
REPORT]; see also Nat’l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at 197 (“The Commission found that at the end of 1938 
there were 660 commercial stations in the United States, and that 341 of these were affiliated with 
national networks.”). 
 64.  CHAIN BROADCASTING REPORT, supra note 63, at 30. 
 65.  See Radio Chains Ask Court Void FCC License Ruling, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Oct. 31, 1941, at 33; 
Jon M. Garon, Hidden Hands that Shaped the Marketplace of Ideas: Television’s Early Transformation 
from Medium to Genre, 19 U. DENV. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 29, 69 (2016) (“Both NBC and CBS brought 
an action to overturn the rule, but smaller broadcasting groups welcomed the FCC efforts to limit NBC 
and CBS.”). See generally CHAIN BROADCASTING REPORT, supra note 63, at 21-25. 
 66.  SHIRLEY BIAGI, MEDIA IMPACT: AN INTRODUCTION TO MASS MEDIA 114-15 (10th ed. 2012).  
 67.  Nat’l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at 198-99. 
 68.  Id. at 199-200 (quoting CHAIN BROADCASTING REPORT, supra note 63, at 52, 57). 
 69.  John C. Abell, Sept. 9, 1926: Radio Sets Up a National Broadcasting Craze, WIRED (Sept. 9, 
2010, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2010/09/0909rca-creates-nbc/ [https://perma.cc/Q6HA-
AGRN] (“RCA tried some fancy footwork—dividing NBC into two companies, NBC (neé Red) and 
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regulations regarding ownership, limitations on exclusive ownership provisions, and 
other direct controls over the structure of the management of the U.S. broadcast 
industry.70 
As understood by the Supreme Court in the 1930s and 1940s, the public interest 
standard allowed Congress to provide technical controls, ownership controls, anti-
monopoly controls, and to choose non-renewal of broadcasters who used profane or 
vulgar language.  Politicians such as President Roosevelt certainly understood the 
power of radio and its role as an arm of the press.71  The Communications Act 
prohibited Congress from the kind of censorship that was common for the licensure 
of motion pictures.72  But the Commission could still impose its will to deny licenses 
to those whose “utterances are vulgar” and not “uplifting or entertaining.”73  The 
Commission continued, “[t]hough we may not censor, it is our duty to see that 
broadcasting licenses do not afford mere personal organs, and also to see that a 
standard of refinement fitting our day and generations is maintained.”74 
In addition, from 1941 through 1949, the FCC’s so-called Mayflower Doctrine75 
had the effect of barring broadcasters from “editorializing over their own 
facilities.”76  The FCC acknowledged the negative aspects of the Mayflower Doctrine 
for purposes of clarifying the actual position of the Commission on content 
restrictions of licensees.  This was an extension of the 1940 FCC position that “[i]n 
carrying out the obligation to render a public service, stations are required to furnish 
well-rounded rather than one-sided discussions of public questions.”77 
The understanding slowly began to change following World War II.  The 
Commission on Freedom of the Press used the term “press” to include “all means of 
communicating to the public news and opinions, emotions and beliefs, whether by 
                                                                                                     
Blue Network Company—but a 1943 Supreme Court decision did not go its way.  So RCA sold Blue 
Network for $8 million, and in 1945 the Blue became the American Broadcasting Company (ABC).”); 
see National Broadcasting Company, NEW WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA, 
https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/National_Broadcasting_Company 
[https://perma.cc/6K2K-SGNV] (last visited Oct. 30, 2020) (“In 1939, the FCC ordered RCA to divest 
itself of one of the two networks . . . . [Eventually,] RCA sold the NBC Blue Network, Inc. for $8 
million to Lifesavers magnate Edward J. Noble in 1943.”). 
 70.  See Nat’l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at 200-01. 
 71.  See Alexandra Gil, Great Expectations: Content Regulation in Film, Radio, and Television, 6 
U. DENV. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 31, 33 (2009) (“President Franklin Roosevelt called radio ‘a great agent 
of public service’ and encouraged the industry to ‘be maintained on an equality of freedom similar to 
that freedom that has been, and is, the keystone of the American press.’” (quoting Censorship Plan 
Denied by Farley, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1934, at 9)). 
 72.  See, e.g., Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 326, 48 Stat. 1064, 1091 (current version at 
47 U.S.C. § 326) (“Nothing in this Act shall be understood or construed to give the Commission the 
power of censorship over the radio communications or signals transmitted by any radio station, and no 
regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the Commission which shall interfere with the 
right of free speech by means of radio communication.”). 
 73.  R. H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. LAW & ECON. 1, 9 (1959). 
 74.  Id. (citation omitted).  
 75.  Mayflower Broad. Corp., 8 F.C.C. 333, 340 (1940) (“[T]he broadcaster cannot be an 
advocate.”). 
 76.  Note, The Mayflower Doctrine Scuttled, 59 YALE L.J. 759, 759 (1950); see VICTOR W. 
PICKARD, AMERICA’S BATTLE FOR MEDIA DEMOCRACY: THE TRIUMPH OF CORPORATE 
LIBERTARIANISM AND THE FUTURE OF MEDIA REFORM 115-16 (2015).  
 77.  6 FCC ANN. REP. 55 (1940). 
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newspapers, magazine, or books, by radio broadcasts, by television, or by films.”78  
Likely due to the role of broadcasting and movies to maintain public morale during 
the war, television, radio, and film were all finally accepted as part of the free speech 
ethos of the United States.79 
By 1948, the Supreme Court began to recognize a slightly different 
understanding of the First Amendment.80  In yet another case finding that there was 
no First Amendment implication regarding antitrust enforcement, the Court noted 
the relevance of free speech.  “We have no doubt that moving pictures, like 
newspapers and radio, are included in the press whose freedom is guaranteed by the 
First Amendment.”81 
But the understanding of broadcast regulation continued to focus on the right of 
the listening public to receive a broad range of content, not controlled by the 
government and not controlled by monopolistic corporate interests.  As the 
Commission phrased this concern, “[t]he most significant meaning of freedom of the 
radio is the right of the American people to listen to this great medium of 
communications free from any governmental dictation as to what they can or cannot 
hear and free alike from similar restraints by private licensees.”82  The Commission 
summarized its understanding of broadcast regulation:  
[T]he individual licensees of radio stations have the responsibility for determining 
the specific program material to be broadcast over their stations.  This choice, 
however, must be exercised in a manner consistent with the basic policy of the 
Congress that radio be maintained as a medium of free speech for the general public 
as a whole rather than as an outlet for the purely personal or private interests of the 
licensee.83 
In 1959, the Nobel Prize winning British economist Ronald Coase published an 
important analysis of the regulation of television and radio by the FCC.84  Coase 
noted that “a commission appointed by the federal government . . . selecting those 
who were to be allowed to publish newspapers and periodicals . . . would, of course, 
be rejected out of hand as inconsistent with the doctrine of freedom of the press.”85  
A decade following the update to the Mayflower Doctrine, Coase described an 
industry that suffered from a great reluctance to editorialize so as to avoid having to 
give up airtime or come under attack regarding the renewal of the station’s broadcast 
                                                                                                     
 78.  THE COMM’N ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS: A GENERAL 
REPORT ON MASS COMMUNICATION 109 (1947); Coase, supra note 73, at 7. 
 79.  See Scott L. Althaus, The Forgotten Role of the Global Newsreel Industry in the Long 
Transition from Text to Television, 15 INT’L J. PRESS/POL. 193, 197-99 (2010) (“The newsreel was the 
first global news medium . . . .”). 
 80.  See, e.g., Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952) (“[E]xpression by means of 
motion pictures is included within the free speech and free press guaranty of the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments.”). 
 81.  United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948). 
 82.  Editorializing by Broad. Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1257 (1949). 
 83.  Id. at 1257. 
 84.  See Thomas W. Hazlett et al., Radio Spectrum and the Disruptive Clarity of Ronald Coase, 54 
J. L & ECON. S125, S125-26 (2011) (“Coase’s (1959) single paper ‘The Federal Communications 
Commission’ has created such a bountiful account balance as to safely capitalize the Economists’ Bank 
of Karma for generations to come.”). 
 85.  Coase, supra note 73, at 7. 
2020] DYSREGULATING THE MEDIA 57 
license.86 
Coase quotes an expert in the field saying that “the most important function of 
radio regulation is the allocation of a scarce factor of production – frequency 
channels.”87  Despite the numerous examples of the FCC removing problematic 
broadcasters and limiting the power of RCA, Coase asserts that the allocation of the 
license is “essentially an economic decision not a policing decision.”88  The 
suggestion he proposes, which is not adopted, is to eliminate the public interest 
licensing model and replace it with a direct sale of the broadcast licenses to the 
public. 
C. Speech Regulation through the Fairness Doctrine 
Coase’s economic model was not adopted by Congress or the Commission.  
Instead, Congress continued to develop rules to promote its goal for the broadcasts 
to be managed for the general benefit of the public.  Two rules, in particular, came 
to define this approach:  the fairness doctrine and the right of reply regulations.  A 
1967 amendment to the Communications Act codified these licensee requirements.  
The fairness doctrine obligated broadcasters to provide equal time to all candidates 
for public office.89  As part of the right of reply regulations,90 when a person was 
attacked during a broadcast, the licensee was required to send a summary, tape, or 
transcript and offer the opportunity to reply, even if the person could not cover the 
cost of the airtime.91 
In Red Lion Broadcasting Co v. FCC, the Supreme Court addressed the 
constitutionality of the fairness doctrine and right of reply regulations, finding that 
these rules were constitutional because they “enhance rather than abridge the 
freedoms of speech and press protected by the First Amendment.”92 
The Court explained the fairness doctrine had two components.  “The 
broadcaster must give adequate coverage to public issues, and coverage must be fair 
in that it accurately reflects the opposing views.”93  The obligations, of course, ran 
much deeper. 
When a personal attack has been made on a figure involved in a public issue . . . the 
individual attacked himself [must] be offered an opportunity to respond.  Likewise, 
where one candidate is endorsed in a political editorial, the other candidates must 
                                                                                                     
 86.  See id.  
 87.  Id. at 14. 
 88.  Id. (quoting Leo Herzel, “Public Interest” and the Market in Color Television Regulation, 18 
U. OF CHI. L. REV. 802, 809 (1951)). 
 89.  Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 315, 48 Stat. 1064, 1088 (current version at 47 U.S.C. 
§ 315(a)) (“315. Candidates for public office; facilities; rules.  (a) If any licensee shall permit any person 
who is a legally qualified candidate for any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford 
equal opportunities to all other such candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting stations . . 
. .”); see also Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of Public 
Importance, 29 Fed. Reg. 10415 (July 25, 1964); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 371 
(1969). 
 90.  See Times-Mirror Broad. Co., 24 P & F Radio Reg. 404 (1962). 
 91.  See Red Lion Broad. Co., 395 U.S. at 371-73. 
 92.  Id. at 375. 
 93.  Id. at 377 (citing United Broad. Co., 10 F.C.C. 515 (1945)); New Broad. Co., 6 P & F Radio 
Reg. 258 (1950). 
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themselves be offered reply time to use personally or through a spokesman.  These 
obligations differ from the general fairness requirement . . . . But insofar as there is 
an obligation of the broadcaster to see that both sides are presented, and insofar as 
that is an affirmative obligation, the personal attack doctrine and regulations do not 
differ from the preceding fairness doctrine.94 
The Court discussed the legislative history of the public interest doctrine and 
found that the right of reply regulations and fairness doctrine were consistently and 
expansively endorsed by Congress and the Commission throughout its history.95  
Having found the regulations were consistent with the Communications Act, the 
Court turned to the appropriateness of these rules within the context of the First 
Amendment. 
The Court affirmed the holding of its 1943 decision, National Broadcasting Co. 
v. United States, reasserting that the issuance or denial of a station license when “‘the 
public interest’ requires it ‘is not a denial of free speech.’”96  The Court also 
explained that broadcast was different than other media: 
 Because of the scarcity of radio frequencies, the Government is permitted to put 
restraints on licensees in favor of others whose views should be expressed on this 
unique medium.  But the people as a whole retain their interest in free speech by 
radio and their collective right to have the medium function consistently with the 
ends and purposes of the First Amendment.  It is the right of the viewers and 
listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.97 
The Court dismissed as speculative the concern that the fairness doctrine and 
right of reply regulations discouraged licensees from airing content that could trigger 
an unwanted reply.98  The Court noted approvingly that “the Commission for 40 
years has been choosing licensees based in part on their program proposals.”99  The 
Court also dismissed the technological innovations that seemed to be making the 
scarcity of broadcast airwaves a thing of the past.100  
In assessing the continuation of the broadcasting jurisprudence, there is certainly 
an argument that even by 1969, the changes in broadcasting were not sufficient to 
overturn forty years of stability in radio and television, or that changes to the First 
Amendment jurisprudence in areas such as defamation law101 or privacy102 
necessarily expanded the application of the First Amendment to broadcast.  At the 
same time, the Court understood that the interpretation of the First Amendment was 
beginning to change.103  The Court acknowledged the vigorous debate in the legal 
                                                                                                     
 94.  Red Lion Broad. Co., 395 U.S. at 378. 
 95.  Id. at 385-86. 
 96.  Id. at 389 (quoting NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 227 (1943)).  
 97.  Id. at 390. 
 98.  Id. at 393 (“[B]roadcasters will be irresistibly forced to self-censorship and their coverage of 
controversial public issues will be eliminated or at least rendered wholly ineffective . . . . At this point, 
however, as the Federal Communications Commission has indicated, that possibility is at best 
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 99.  Id. at 394. 
 100.  Id. at 396-97. 
 101.  See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 102.  See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). 
 103.  Red Lion Broad. Co., 395 U.S. at 386.  
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literature regarding the argument that the First Amendment can be protected by 
allowing the government to regulate speech rather than allowing the marketplace to 
determine the efficacy of speech.104 
The unique regulation of broadcast was highlighted by Florida’s effort to 
enforce a right of reply statute for newspapers.  In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. 
Tornillo, the Supreme Court utterly rejected the applicability of Red Lion to print 
media.105  Nonetheless, the Supreme Court continued to enforce the public interest 
approach to the First Amendment for broadcast.106  The specific requirements of the 
fairness doctrine took nearly two more decades to be finally put to rest.107  The FCC 
itself determined that the fairness doctrine chilled speech, metastasizing into “a 
pervasive and significant impediment to the broadcasting of controversial issues of 
public importance.”108  
D. Continued Regulation Beyond the Fairness Doctrine 
The Supreme Court has continued to permit regulation of broadcast television 
and radio to different standards than those of other media.109  In Turner Broadcasting 
System, Inc. v. FCC (Turner I),110 the Court again noted the distinction between 
broadcast radio and television from the regulation of the cable industry.111  Since the 
focus of the case was the level of First Amendment scrutiny appropriate to regulation 
governing the cable industry, the Court declined to address the relevance of the 
scarcity doctrine.112  The Court reviewed the must-carry provisions of the Cable Act 
                                                                                                     
 104.  Id. (“The general problems raised by a technology which supplants atomized, relatively 
informal communication with mass media as a prime source of national cohesion and news were 
discussed at considerable length by Zechariah Chafee in Government and Mass Communications 
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 105.  Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974). 
 106.  See CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 396 (1981) (upholding broadcasters’ obligations to provide 
time for national political candidates upheld). 
 107.  See Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Comm’n’s Rules & Reguls. Concerning the Gen. 
Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broad. Licensees, 102 F.C.C.2d 142, 169 (1985), appeal dismissed sub 
nom. Radio-Television News Dirs. Ass’n v. FCC, 809 F.2d 860 (D.C. Cir. 1987) [hereinafter 1985 
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WTVH Syracuse, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 2 FCC Rcd. 5043 (1987) (providing a 
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 108.  1985 Fairness Report, supra note 107, at 169 para 42; Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 
F.2d 654, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“[T]he FCC’s decision that the fairness doctrine no longer served the 
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doctrine was no longer constitutional.”). 
 109.  See generally FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364 (1984); Turner Broad. 
Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622 (1994). 
 110.  Turner I, 512 U.S. at 645. 
 111.  Id. at 637 (“[T]he rationale for applying a less rigorous standard of First Amendment scrutiny 
to broadcast regulation, whatever its validity in the cases elaborating it, does not apply in the context of 
cable regulation.”). 
 112.  Id. at 638-39 (“Although courts and commentators have criticized the scarcity rationale since its 
inception, we have declined to question its continuing validity as support for our broadcast 
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and ultimately remanded after establishing that “the appropriate standard by which 
to evaluate the constitutionality of must-carry is the intermediate level of scrutiny 
applicable to content-neutral restrictions that impose an incidental burden on 
speech.”113 
In an important reassessment of the case following its remand, the Supreme 
Court upheld the must carry provisions as meeting the intermediate scrutiny standard 
of United States v. O’Brien.114  The Court found that the three goals of the must-
carry provisions were to further important governmental interests:  “(1) preserving 
the benefits of free, over-the-air local broadcast television, (2) promoting the 
widespread dissemination of information from a multiplicity of sources, and (3) 
promoting fair competition in the market for television programming.”115 
Unlike the vague demands of the public interest standards underlying the 
Communications Act, the goals of continuing free access to public news, 
entertainment, and educational information provides a very clear goal for Congress 
and administrative regulators.  The goal to maintain a multiplicity of sources remains 
essentially the same goal that drove the original Radio Act and shaped the Chain 
Broadcasting prohibitions.  Promoting fair competition is a standard much more open 
to interpretation, but in the remand of Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC 
(Turner II), the question was not whether such a standard could be upheld, but 
whether there was a sufficiently demonstrated governmental need to support the 
must-carry rules as a way to promote the multiplicity of news and information 
sources. 
With regard to the third goal, promoting fair competition for television, the 
Court found little difficulty in upholding the efforts of Congress.  “[T]he 
Government’s interest in eliminating restraints on fair competition is always 
substantial, even when the individuals or entities subject to particular regulations are 
engaged in expressive activity protected by the First Amendment.”116 
In concurrence, Justice Breyer emphasized an aspect of the must-carry 
provisions that received only minimal attention from the majority.  
 [The statute] undoubtedly seeks to provide over-the-air viewers who lack cable 
with a rich mix of over-the-air programming by guaranteeing the over-the-air 
stations that provide such programming with the extra dollars that an additional 
cable audience will generate.  I believe that this purpose—to assure the over-the-air 
public “access to a multiplicity of information sources,”—provides sufficient basis 
for rejecting appellants’ First Amendment claim.117 
Thus, Justice Breyer emphasized the second public interest goal of Congress.  
                                                                                                     
jurisprudence, and see no reason to do so here. . . . [C]able television does not suffer from the inherent 
limitations that characterize the broadcast medium.” (internal citation omitted)). 
 113.  Id. at 662 (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989)); United States v. 
O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
 114.  Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner II), 520 U.S. 180, 189 (1997) (“A content-neutral 
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 115.  Id. at 189. 
 116.  Id. at 190 (quoting Turner I, 512 U.S. at 664). 
 117.  Id. at 226 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Turner I, 512 U.S. at 663). 
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The majority was specific, if not as voluble, as the concurrence regarding the 
importance of this goal.  The Court said, “assuring that the public has access to a 
multiplicity of information sources is a governmental purpose of the highest order, 
for it promotes values central to the First Amendment.”118  The Turner II Court 
rejected arguments that this goal could be satisfied by assuring a minimum number 
of broadcasters.119 
The ability for Congress to continue to address the concerns regarding those 
listeners and viewers who lack access to paid content services from cable systems 
remains a growing concern.  As such, the transition from a First Amendment 
jurisprudential model with no meaningful oversight to a system requiring content 
neutral regulations that further the government interest should not impose burdens 
too high for the government to overcome. 
III. THE MOVE TO DIGITAL DISTRIBUTION 
At first glance, the history of radio and television regulations may have little 
relevance to the transformation of media in the Internet Age.  However, television 
and radio companies remain dominant as media producers and distributors, so the 
potential for them to be disconnected with mainstream media could have far-reaching 
implications.  The FCC’s broadcast media policy provides the scaffolding against 
which cable, satellite and Internet content distribution is structured. 
Traditional broadcasters CBS, NBC, and ABC were founded during the age of 
radio regulation.120  Fox was the only successful network launched during the age of 
television regulation.121  There are a multiplicity of cable “networks,” which are 
services providing programming on one or more cable channels.122  The four major 
network-owned or affiliated stations, however, account for approximately eighty 
percent of the television broadcasters.  The remaining broadcasters are comprised of 
noncommercial stations, independent stations, and stations affiliated with smaller 
networks with specialty program, such as Spanish language content.123 
Although it was not the first online streaming media service, when Netflix 
                                                                                                     
 118.  Turner I, 512 U.S. at 663; Turner II, 520 U.S. at 190. 
 119.  Turner II, 520 U.S. at 191-92. 
 120.  See Harold L. Erickson, CBS Corporation, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, https://www. 
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 122.  See, e.g., Cable Television, FCC, https://www.fcc.gov/media/engineering/cable-television 
[https://perma.cc/QNU4-GYQ5] (Dec. 15, 2015). 
 123.  JOSEPH TUROW, MEDIA TODAY: MASS COMMUNICATION IN A CONVERGING WORLD 391-92 
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switched from a DVD-by-mail service to a streaming service, it heralded in a new 
era in film and television content distribution.124  Unlike Hulu, which continues to 
be owned by various traditional media conglomerates,125  Netflix represented a 
media competitor without any ties to the broadcast industry.126  
The gravitational center of traditional television is shifting from the 
broadcaster—as delivered through cable systems—to the online, “over-the-top” 
(OTT or streaming) media services.127  “18 to 34-year-olds spent just 25% of their 
media consuming time with the TV, compared to 58% on connected devices.”128  The 
trends are beginning to impact older viewers as well.  “[O]lder audiences globally 
also are jumping on the OTT bandwagon, with 42% of consumers 45-54 years old 
having at least one [subscription video on demand (SVOD)] in 2016, up from 25% 
a year earlier.  In 2017, nearly one-third of consumers 55+ subscribed to a video 
service, up from 19% in 2016.”129  
By 2019, the expansion of streaming services was even more pronounced: 
 A special survey into U.S. consumer sentiment toward streaming platforms . . . 
found that 91% of all respondents and a whopping 96% of respondents 18-34 
subscribe to a paid streaming video service.  Beyond that, there is still room to 
expand the number and variety of services, as nearly one-third of all respondents 
and almost half (47%) of respondents 18-34 say they currently subscribe to three or 
more paid services.130  
Consumers are increasingly turning to streaming content first and to live 
television as a supplement, which is a fundamental restructuring of the relationship 
between the content producers and the public.  “Subscription and ad-supported OTT 
services are steadily replacing traditional content delivery and there’s no end to the 
opportunity to create connections with a global audience.  OTT is not traditional 
TV.”131 
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interact with cinema and television, Netflix raises an array of considerations about how we project an 
innovative cinematic vision for the future of viewing . . . media.”); GINA KEATING, NETFLIXED: THE 
EPIC BATTLE FOR AMERICA’S EYEBALLS 225 (2012). 
 125.  Kirsten Korosec, Hulu Buys Back AT&T’s Minority Stake in Streaming Service Now Valued at 
$15 Billion, TECH CRUNCH (Apr. 15, 2019, 6:28 PM), https://www.fcc.gov/media/engineering/cable-
television [https://perma.cc/Y2BY-UPDS]. 
 126.  JIM O’NEILL, STATE OF THE BROADCAST INDUSTRY 2019: BROADCASTERS AND OTT: IT’S ALL 
IN THE FAMILY 1 (Ooyala 2019), http://go.ooyala.com/rs/447-EQK-225/images/Ooyala-State-Of-The-
Broadcast-Industry-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/E8ZG-CQSU] (“Netflix’s move into streaming video on 
demand was met with a shrug of shoulders and, occasionally, outright dismissal.”).  See generally 
KEATING, supra note 124, at 225. 
 127.  Sahil Patel, WTF is OTT?, DIGIDAY (July 7, 2015), https://digiday.com/media/what-is-over-the-
top-ott/ [https://perma.cc/M4PN-S2WZ] (“OTT stands for ‘over-the-top,’ the term used for the delivery 
of film and TV content via the internet, without requiring users to subscribe to a traditional cable or 
satellite pay-TV service like a Comcast or Time Warner Cable.”). 
 128.  O’NEILL, supra note 126, at 2. 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  NIELSEN CO., THE NIELSEN TOTAL AUDIENCE REPORT: FEBRUARY 2020, at 5 (2020), https:// 
go.nielsen.com/totalaudience/report/2020/feb/ [https://perma.cc/2ZB9-S58S].  
 131.  O’Neill, supra note 126, at 4. 
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There is also more than viewer preference driving the transformation.  
According to Nielsen Co., “time and money—not interest—are the limiting factors.  
Nearly two-thirds cited the overall cost of media services, while 40% admitted there 
is only so much content they currently have time to consume.”132  While digital 
advertising is growing, television advertising payments are evidencing a steady 
decline.133  Unlike the advertising buy on television which is distributed to all 
viewers, digital advertising can be tailored to specific audience targets.134  While 
some OTT services such as Netflix and Amazon Prime are ad-free, others are not.  
For advertiser-funded OTT, the distributors have the ability to provide television 
with segmented advertising.135 
Advertisers have a strong incentive to direct their content at the consumers most 
likely to respond to their ads.  Yet seventy-four percent of the public surveyed said 
they find the television commercials irrelevant.136  Advertisers hate the waste, and 
they hope the public will be more willing to watch relevant ads.137  “The stitching 
together of digital audiences with TV audiences opens up the market to become more 
fluid for marketers looking to target consumers beyond the typical Nielsen age, sex 
demos.”138 
If addressable advertising drives advertisers to shift their investment in OTT 
rather than in broadcast content, the financial support for broadcasting will erode.  
Faced with consumer flight to the OTT platforms and advertiser flight driven by 
addressable advertising and the consumption shift, the economic viability of 
broadcast could soon hit a tipping point.139  Once that happens, most content would 
                                                                                                     
More than 76% of America’s 128 million broadband households take at least one major 
streaming service—Netflix, Amazon or Hulu . . . . Another 8% take a virtual pay-TV 
service like YouTube TV or DirecTV Now.  A Deloitte study found the average streaming 
household subscribes to three services, and that doesn’t include ad-supported services. 
Id. 
 132.  NIELSEN CO., supra note 130, at 8.  
 133.  Id. (“National TV ad sales peaked in 2016, when they exceeded $43 billion, according to data 
from Magna, the ad-buying and media intelligence arm of IPG Mediabrands.  Sales fell 2.2 percent last 
year, and the firm estimates that they will fall at least 2 percent each year through 2022.”). 
 134.  Id. (“Companies love digital advertising because it gives them the ability to target ads based on 
their own lists of customers—like holders of store loyalty cards—and profiles like ‘first-time car buyers’ 
or ‘people who like foreign travel.’”). 
 135.  See Edward C. Malthouse et al., Understanding Programmatic TV Advertising, 35 INT’L J. 
ADVERT. 769, 773 (2018).  
There are two different, and increasingly competing, approaches to buying/selling 
advertising media.  The mass approach is characterized by media companies selling mass 
audiences through a sales force to advertisers who inform their decisions with probability 
samples such as Nielsen panel data.  The computational advertising approach is marked by 
purchasing individual exposures informed by whatever data may be available about the 
device, cookie, household, etc. 
Id. at 769. 
 136.  Alan Wolk, Television is Embracing Audience Segmentation as Addressable OTT Continues to 
Explode, FORBES (Aug. 6, 2018, 10:43 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/alanwolk/2018/08/06/television-is-embracing-audience-segmentation-as-
addressable-ott-continue-to-explode/#380f81f85c12 [https://perma.cc/LYG6-ZQ6C]. 
 137.  See id.  
 138.  Id.  
 139.  The third factor disrupting broadcast and cable is the availability of 5G or faster wireless.  This 
technology is anticipated to roll out over the next 2–3 years.  See Todd Haselton, The Way You Get TV 
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be originated for OTT and the infrastructure for broadcasting would be discarded.  
Congress may receive significant pressure to eventually auction off the broadcast 
spectrum that it has managed on behalf of the public for radio and television 
broadcast. 
IV. FCC BACKS OFF OWNERSHIP RULES BUT RETAINS PUBLIC INTEREST GOALS 
FOR PUBLIC BROADCASTING AND CHILDREN’S PROGRAMMING  
To many, the shift to OTT content distribution is an inevitable and welcome 
change.  Nonetheless, the FCC remains a significant influence on broadcast content, 
and without the use of the scarce broadcast spectrum, these regulations could cease 
to exist.140  The scope of the regulation is a mere shadow of the FCC’s control of 
radio and television in its early years.  The rules barring common ownership of 
television and newspaper stations in the same market were eliminated in 2017.141  
The change allowed Sinclair Broadcast Group to acquire Tribune Media through 
a merger that significantly increased Sinclair’s national reach.142  Sinclair distributes 
the same content to all its stations, highlighting concerns first raised during debates 
on the Radio Act that national operators would fail to support local journalism or be 
mindful of local interests.143  The two dissenting members of the Commission raised 
concerns that the change undermines access to local news coverage.144  The New 
York Times quoted Democratic Commissioner Mignon Clyburn, “who voted against 
the orders,” as saying that “[d]uring the first 10 months of 2017, the [FCC] majority 
has given the green light to more than a dozen actions that are a direct attack on 
consumers and small businesses.”145  
Although television ownership rules have been significantly relaxed, they have 
not yet been eliminated.  The television ownership rules operate to keep a network 
from owning stations that reach more than thirty-nine percent of the U.S. TV 
                                                                                                     
and Internet at Home is about to Change Drastically – for the Better, CNBC (Aug. 15, 2018, 5:26 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/alanwolk/2018/08/06/television-is-embracing-audience-segmentation-as-
addressable-ott-continue-to-explode/#380f81f85c12 [https://perma.cc/A5DD-3KWU] (“The current 
wireless standard . . . is fast but not quite fast enough for an entire house of people to play games and 
stream 4K movies at the same time . . . . The technology for 5G is fast enough for that, and you can 
forget the cords.”).  
 140.  The FCC also has regulations related to efforts to promote diversity in the media workforce.  
See Christina Shu Jien Chong, Back to the Drawing Board! Legislating Hollywood: A Regulation that 
Resolves the Film Industry’s Conflict Between the First and Fourteenth Amendments, 35 GA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 605, 611-14 (2019) (raising public interest claims regarding employment and anti-discrimination). 
 141.  See 2014 Quadrennial Regul. Rev.—Rev. of the Comm’n’s Broad. Ownership Rules & Other 
Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecomms. Act of 1996, Order on Reconsideration and 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 32 FCC Rcd. 9802, 9806-24 (2017) [hereinafter Order on 
Reconsideration]; Rules and Policies to Promote New Entry and Ownership Diversity in Broadcasting 
Services, 83 Fed. Reg. 774 (proposed Jan. 8, 2018) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 73). 
 142.  See Cecilia Kang, F.C.C. Opens Door to Increased Consolidation in TV Industry, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 17, 2017, at B2. 
 143.  See id.; see also John Samples, Broadcast Localism and the Lessons of the Fairness Doctrine, 
POLICY ANALYSIS, no. 639, May 27, 2009, https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa639.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/24S2-WDBC].  
 144.  Kang, supra note 142. 
 145.  Id.  
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households to effectively bar a merger among ABC, CBS, Fox, and NBC.146  This 
rule is no longer designed to protect the diversity of viewpoint and content in any 
particular television market, but instead to slow the consolidation of the media 
industry.147  
Despite political criticism, there has been no significant movement to eliminate 
the separate existence of the Corporation of Public Broadcasting and the regulations 
that allow for special set-asides and regulations for noncommercial broadcasting.148  
Given the scarcity of broadcast spectrum, setting aside broadcast licenses for 
noncommercial broadcasters is a form of content regulation, but it is also a 
congressional statement about public interest priorities.  The Public Broadcasting 
Act was passed in 1967 in furtherance of that public interest.149   Public Broadcasting 
furthers the general welfare to encourage public telecommunications services which 
will be responsive to the interests of people both in particular localities and 
throughout the United States, which will constitute an expression of diversity and 
excellence, and which will constitute a source of alternative telecommunications 
services for all the citizens of the Nation.150  
Similar to the must-carry rules for cable systems, the congressional mandate to 
set aside broadcast spectrum for this purpose is an appropriate solution to address 
the substantial governmental interest.151  
Another area where the Commission has not completely deregulated the 
broadcast marketplace involves children’s television.  In 1990, Congress passed the 
Children’s Television Act (CTA), mandating at least three hours of educational 
children’s television programming and limiting the advertisements offered during 
                                                                                                     
 146.  FCC Broadcast Ownership Rules, FCC, http://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/fccs-review-
broadcast-ownership-rules [https://perma.cc/5SCX-46C2] (Jan. 17, 2020).  
 147.  See Gerard Daley, Column: Closing Argument Fight the Entertainment Industry Cartel, 23 L.A. 
LAW. 68, 68 (2000). 
When the Media Monopoly, Ben Bagdikian’s classic vivisection of the media industry’s 
power relations, was published in 1983, the number of corporations that effectively 
controlled publishing, print journalism, film production and distribution, music, radio, 
television, and eventually the Internet was about 50.  When his book went into its fifth 
edition in 1997 that number had dwindled to 10. In light of the recent Viacom-CBS 
nuptials, a sixth edition is sorely needed: the cartel’s membership today is down to about 
five. 
Id. at 68. 
 148.  See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 303(a)-(b), 394, 396, 399a, 399b (2018); 47 C.F.R. § 73.503 (2020); see 
also Jonathan M. Phillips, Freedom by Design: Objective Analysis and the Constitutional Status of 
Public Broadcasting, 155 U. PENN. L. REV. 991, 992 (2007) (“[T]he interplay between governance and 
programming content choices raises salient First Amendment issues of editorial autonomy and 
independence from government influence.”) 
 149.  See Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-129, 81 Stat. 365 (codified as amended at 
47 U.S.C. §§ 390-397, 609).  
 150.  Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 § 201(9) (current version at 47 U.S.C. § 396(a)(5)). 
 151.  See Minority Television Project, Inc. v. FCC, 736 F.3d 1192, 1201-04 (9th Cir. 2013) (The 
regulations of the Public Broadcasting Act were “designed to further the important governmental 
interest in preserving the essentially noncommercial nature of public broadcasting within a minimal 
regulatory framework by insulating public broadcasters from commercial marketplace pressures and 
decisions.” (quoting Comm’n Pol’y Concerning the Noncom. Nature of Educ. Broad. Stations, 90 
F.C.C.2d 895, 896 (1982))). 
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those broadcasts.152 
Although there was originally great skepticism regarding the need for the 
CTA,153 the commitment to children’s broadcast content dropped significantly in the 
1980s.  Television shows like Captain Kangaroo disappeared from the morning 
schedule,154  and overall hours of production “dropped from 11 per week in 1980” 
down to “fewer than two per week in 1990.”155  Following the adoption of the statute, 
the FCC issued comprehensive regulations to define educational and informational 
programming and set the minimums for broadcaster compliance.156  Although the 
policies are complex and allow for a number of exceptions, the general obligation 
requires each broadcaster provide three hours of “[c]ore [p]rogramming” to serve 
“the educational and informational needs of children 16 years of age and under.”157   
Somewhat surprisingly, despite the massive deregulation by the FCC, these 
rules are being adjusted only modestly.158  Under the 2019 rules, the core 
programming requirement will expand to start at 6:00 a.m. rather than 7:00 a.m., 
permit expanded use of educational specials, and permit more short-form content.159  
The obligation to maintain 156 hours of core children’s programming annually 
remains in place.160  One of the important findings of the Commission focuses on the 
impact of poverty and access disparity to broadcast regulations.  The Commission 
recognized that new media alternatives are not universally available equally to all 
members of the public: 
 Nevertheless, while it is clear that the media landscape has evolved dramatically 
since the children’s programming rules were adopted, we recognize that not all 
children, particularly children in minority and low-income households, have access 
to the wealth of children’s educational programming available on non-broadcast 
platforms.  Nielsen data indicate that as of May 2018, more than 14% of television 
households in the U.S. (over 16 million households) are over-the-air households 
                                                                                                     
 152.  See Children’s Television Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-437, 104 Stat. 996; Minority Television 
Project, Inc., 736 F.3d at 1201; Joel Timmer, Changes in the Children’s Television Marketplace, the 
Children’s Television Act, and the First Amendment, 37 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 731, 739 (2019) 
(“[B]roadcasters are not required to air three hours of core programming per week; however, those that 
do simply have the certainty that the CTA portion of their license renewal would be routinely 
approved.”). 
 153.  See Child.’s Television Programming & Advert. Pracs., Report and Order 96 F.C.C.2d 634, 
647-48 para 32 (1984). 
 154.  See Regulations on Children’s Television Programming in the United States, WIKIPEDIA, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regulations_on_children%27s_television_programming_in_the_United_S
tates [https://perma.cc/9MDL-27CM] (last visited Oct. 30, 2020) (“In 1982, the Reagan administration’s 
FCC chairman Mark S. Fowler lamented upon CBS’s decision to move its long-running children’s 
series Captain Kangaroo . . . to weekends, in order to accommodate an expanded morning newscast. 
CBS had already shortened the program from a full hour to 30 minutes in 1981 . . . .”). 
 155.  Timmer, supra note 152, at 736 (quoting S. REP. NO. 101-66, at 1 (1989)). 
 156.  Pol’ys & Rules Concerning Child.’s Television Programming, Report and Order 11 FCC Rcd. 
10660, 10662-63 para. 5 (1996). 
 157.  47 C.F.R. § 73.671(c) (2020). 
 158.  See generally Children’s Television Programming Rules; Modernization of Media Regulation 
Initiative, 84 Fed. Reg. 41917 (Aug. 16, 2019) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 73). 
 159.  Id. at 41921 
 160.  Id. at 41922. 
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(i.e., they do not subscribe to cable or satellite television).161 
The statutory authority and regulatory implementation of public broadcasting 
set-asides continue to be judged using the intermediate scrutiny standard articulated 
in O’Brien.162  Given the substantial public interest of Congress in providing access 
to educational and cultural content to members of the public, including a significant 
population who may not be able to afford purchasing non-broadcast access, these 
regulations are likely to continue to be upheld under intermediate scrutiny.  The 
children’s programming rules have not been challenged in court, and the 
Commission seems well within its mandate “to strike a balance between our interest 
in modernizing our rules to reflect the growth in the amount of children's educational 
programming available on broadcast . . . with the reality that some children in 
minority and low-income households still rely on live, over-the-air broadcast 
television.”163 
V. THE LIKELY DEMISE OF INDECENCY REGULATION 
Explicit content regulation is another area for which the FCC has famously 
attempted to regulate the air.  Presently, 18 U.S.C. § 1464 provides that “[w]hoever 
utters any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication 
shall be fined . . . or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.”164  The FCC had 
been enforcing various versions of the indecency standard since the adoption of the 
Radio Act,165 but the Commission formalized the standard in response to the 
increasing significance of the First Amendment over the decades.166  The FCC has 
used license authority and pressure on the broadcasters, but has not often involved 
the criminal provisions until urged by Congress to do so.167  The Supreme Court 
upheld the indecency policy in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,168 but has since avoided 
                                                                                                     
 161.  Id. at 41921. 
 162.  See, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 402 (1984) (striking down ban on 
editorializing); Minority Television Project, Inc. v. FCC, 736 F.3d 1192, 1195 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(upholding ban on advertising on public television stations). 
 163.  Children’s Television Programming Rules; Modernization of Media Regulation Initiative, 84 
Fed. Reg. at 41921. 
 164.  18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2018); FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 243 (2012). 
 165.  See, e.g., Trinity Methodist Church, S. v. Fed. Radio Comm’n, 62 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1932); 
Angela J. Campbell, Pacifica Reconsidered: Implications for the Current Controversy over Broadcast 
Indecency, 63 FED. COMM. L.J. 195, 198 (2010) (“Both § 1464 of the Criminal Code and section 326 of 
the Communications Act originated in the Radio Act of 1927. . . .”); Lili Levi, “Smut and Nothing but”: 
The FCC, Indecency, and Regulatory Transformations in the Shadows, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 509, 520 
(2013) (“NBC’s banning of Mae West from the air for a suggestive reading of a radio skit [on the Edgar 
Bergen show, playing Eve in the Garden of Eden] indicates that such informal reprimands were 
sufficient to maintain decorum on the air.” (citing Steve Craig, Out of Eden: The Legion of Decency, the 
FCC, and Mae West’s 1937 Appearance on The Chase & Sanborn Hour, 13 J. RADIO STUD. 232 (2006) 
as background information)).  
 166.  See Indus. Guidance on the Comm’n’s Case Law Interpreting 18 U.S.C § 1464 & Enf’t Pol’ys 
Regarding Broad. Indecency, Policy Statement, 16 FCC Rcd. 7999, 8000 para. 4 (2001). 
 167.  See Campbell, supra note 165, at 199 (“In practice, neither the DOJ nor the FCC actively 
enforced § 1464 prior to 1970.  In 1969, the Senate Subcommittee on Communications held a hearing 
and strongly suggested that the FCC do more to curb offensive broadcasting.”). 
 168.  FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).  
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either reaffirming that decision or rejecting the standard.169 
Outside of the broadcast context, however, the Supreme Court has been quite 
strident in rejecting indecency regulations.  Early efforts by Congress to tame the 
indecent, vulgar, and pornographic content on the Internet were met with little 
success.  Congress began its efforts to reign in the Internet with the Communications 
Decency Act of 1996 (CDA).170 In Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, the 
Supreme Court struck down portions of the CDA “enacted to protect minors from 
‘indecent’ and ‘patently offensive’ communications on the Internet.”171  The Court 
found that the statute was neither narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
governmental interest nor did it offer the least restrictive alternative to its goals, 
however compelling they might have been.172 
The Court rejected the second effort of Congress to regulate minors’ access to 
indecent online speech in Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union.173  The 
Supreme Court made the point very clear that “[c]ontent-based prohibitions, 
enforced by severe criminal penalties, have the constant potential to be a repressive 
force in the lives and thoughts of a free people.  To guard against that threat the 
Constitution demands that content-based restrictions on speech be presumed 
invalid.”174  
More recently, in Matal v. Tam, the Supreme Court struck down the regulations 
of the Patent and Trademark Office to deny trademark registration for any mark that 
may “disparage . . . or bring . . . into contemp[t] or disrepute” any “persons, living 
or dead.”175  Although there is a distinction between the government’s interest in 
preventing speech that offends because of its message—as framed in Tam—instead 
of its vulgarity, as understood in Pacifica, the governmental interest seems very 
similar.  
The distinction became even smaller when the Supreme Court followed Tam 
with Iancu v. Brunetti.176  Here, the Supreme Court struck down another of the 
Trademark Act’s “prohibitions on registration—one applying to marks that 
‘[c]onsist[ ] of or comprise[ ] immoral[ ] or scandalous matter.’”177  The test for the 
Patent and Trademark Office turned on the examiner’s understanding whether the 
term was disgraceful, offensive, disreputable, or vulgar.178  It is very hard to 
                                                                                                     
 169.  FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 258 (2012) (“[B]ecause the Court resolves 
these cases on fair notice grounds under the Due Process Clause, it need not address the First 
Amendment implications of the Commission’s indecency policy.”). 
 170.  Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, §§ 501-561, 110 Stat. 133, 133-
143. 
 171.  Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 906 (1997).  
 172.  Id. at 879 (“The breadth of this content-based restriction of speech imposes an especially heavy 
burden on the Government to explain why a less restrictive provision would not be as effective as the 
CDA.  It has not done so.”). 
 173.  Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 659 (2004). 
 174.  Id. at 660.  While other decisions distinguish between restrictions on obscene material that lies 
outside the scope of First Amendment protection and indecent or pornographic material that retains such 
protection, obscenity is quite narrowly drawn.  See Sable Commc’ns of Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 124 
(1989) (“The protection of the First Amendment does not extend to obscene speech.”). 
 175.  Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a)). 
 176.  Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294 (2019). 
 177.  Id. at 2298. 
 178.  Id. The larger list of offensive synonyms is described by the Court: 
2020] DYSREGULATING THE MEDIA 69 
distinguish this standard from the indecency standard of Pacifica.  This is even more 
obvious since the trademark denied registration was the word “Fuct.”179  
For OTT, the modality of the television content is distributed on the Internet.  
Congress did not place much effort in controlling obscenity or indecency on the 
Internet,180 but instead focused its efforts on protecting children from harmful 
speech.  In the Child Online Protection Act (COPA),181 Congress tried to provide a 
narrowly tailored protection for minors against content “harmful to minors.”182  
Congress could not, however, demonstrate that the statute represented the least 
restrictive means to accomplish the congressional goal.  Ultimately, Congress could 
not draft a sufficiently narrow statute to withstand constitutional scrutiny.183 
As these free speech cases suggest, the indecency regulation of the FCC will 
likely end with the demise of over-the-air broadcasting.  It is possible that these 
regulations will end much earlier because the increasingly insignificant market share 
of broadcast makes the enforcement somewhat arbitrary.184  Furthermore, Iancu v. 
Brunetti cast any remaining legitimacy of Pacifica into grave doubt.  Given the 
difficultly faced by the FCC in crafting a sufficiently narrow regulation in FCC v. 
Fox, indecency regulation may be a thing of the past.185 
                                                                                                     
To determine whether a mark fits in the category, the PTO asks whether a “substantial 
composite of the general public” would find the mark “shocking to the sense of truth, 
decency, or propriety”; “giving offense to the conscience or moral feelings”; “calling out 
for condemnation”; “disgraceful”; “offensive”; “disreputable”; or “vulgar.” 
Id. 
 179.  Id. at 2297 (“Respondent Erik Brunetti is an artist and entrepreneur who founded a clothing line 
that uses the trademark FUCT.”). 
 180.  See Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 502, 110 Stat. 56, 133.  
This statute was immediately struck down as unconstitutional.  See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 
(1997). 
 181.  Child Online Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 231,112 Stat. 2681, 2861736 to -739 
(1998) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231). 
 182.  Child Online Protection Act § 231(e)(6) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6)). 
Material that is “harmful to minors” is defined as: 
any communication, picture, image, graphic image file, article, recording, writing, or other 
matter of any kind that is obscene or that— 
(A) the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find, taking 
the material as a whole and with respect to minors, is designed to appeal to, or is designed 
to pander to, the prurient interest; 
(B) depicts, describes, or represents, in a manner patently offensive with respect to minors, 
an actual or simulated sexual act or sexual contact, an actual or simulated normal or 
perverted sexual act, or a lewd exhibition of the genitals or post-pubescent female breast; 
and 
(C) taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors. 
Id. 
 183.  ACLU v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 181, 207 (3d Cir. 2008) (“It is apparent that COPA, like the 
Communications Decency Act before it, ‘effectively suppresses a large amount of speech that adults 
have a constitutional right to receive and to address to one another,’. . . and thus is overbroad.” (quoting 
Reno, 521 U.S. at 874)).  
 184.  See, e.g., Maria Fontenot & Michael T. Martinez, FCC’s Indecency Regulation: A Comparative 
Analysis of Broadcast and Online Media, 26 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 59, 64 (2019) (considering FCC v. 
Fox); L.A. Powe, Jr., Red Lion and Pacifica: Are They Relics? 36 PEPP. L. REV. 445, 452-53 (2009). 
 185.  See Barton Beebe & Jeanne C. Fromer, Immoral or Scandalous Marks: An Empirical Analysis, 
8 NYU J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 169, 199-200 (2019). 
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VI. THE NEED FOR CONTENT NEUTRAL REGULATIONS OF THE MARKETPLACE 
The Internet has not proved to be the utopian media platform some hoped it 
would become.186  Tim Berners-Lee, one of the pioneers of the World Wide Web, 
“understood how the epic power of the Web would radically transform governments, 
businesses, [and] societies.  He also envisioned that his invention could, in the wrong 
hands, become a destroyer of world[s] . . . .”187  Much like the radio of the early 
twentieth century, the various platforms are filled with both high quality fare and the 
vulgar and profane.188  
Nonetheless, as established by Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, Sable 
Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, and Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties 
Union, the Supreme Court has limited congressional oversight of content to the 
obscene material that is outside the scope of First Amendment protection.  This 
article does not suggest that Congress should continue any efforts at limiting access 
to constitutionally protected speech, even for minors. 
Nonetheless, there remain substantial and compelling interests at stake in a 
lightly regulated media environment on the Internet.   Primarily, these interests fall 
into three categories.  First, there is a compelling need to continue free access to 
news, educational, and cultural programming for the economically disadvantaged.  
Second, there is a need to assure that all members of the public are afforded equal 
access to the content provided by media providers, and to prohibit “digital redlining” 
of public accommodations to enforce civil rights laws.  And third, there is a 
compelling government interest in the privacy of its citizens to regulate the tracking 
and surveillance of the public.  Each of these interests is content neutral and can be 
accomplished in manners that place little or no burden on lawful speech.  
In addition, the government has a compelling interest in promoting a diversity 
of viewpoint; upholding free and fair elections; enforcing constitutionally permitted 
defamation actions; and in punishing criminal and fraudulent conduct committed 
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through speech.  These goals, however, are content based, making any narrow 
tailoring of these efforts extremely challenging.  Nonetheless, since the public is 
served best if these goals are met, regulatory efforts may be justified.  
A. Public Access to Narrow the Digital Divide 
Public access to telecommunications has been a fundamental part of the U.S. 
communications policy since its early inception.  The 1934 Communications Act 
included an obligation to “make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the 
United States . . . a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio 
communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges.”189  While 
ubiquitous, 10% of the U.S. public still did not use the Internet in 2019.190  Although 
that number has dropped from 48% when the Pew Research Center began its study 
in 2000,191 there is still a significant population not being served. 
The population not using the Internet is older and poorer.  Twenty-seven percent 
of adults over 65 do not use the Internet, compared with just 3% of those between 
30-49.192  But even among adults age 50-64, the number of non-users is 12%.193  
Equally important, for those with incomes under $30,000, the percentage of all adults 
who do not use the internet is 18%.194  In addition, to use the new media services, 
usage requires more than the Internet.  The user must have a broadband connection 
or sufficiently robust service that it can support video streaming or downloading. 
Penetration of Internet and broadband are not reaching the entire republic, 
emphasizing economic, age, geographic, and racial disparities.195  Price continues to 
be a significant barrier to broadband access, and in order “to achieve a 10% increase 
in broadband subscribership, an average price decrease of approximately 15% is 
needed.”196  In addition, there are related barriers to broadband adoption.  These may 
include “factors such as lack of skills to use the technology, lack of computer or 
device, and lack of relevance of the online experience.”197 
In addition, the cost for content is added on top of the cost for Internet access.  
Netflix, Disney+, CBS All Access, and most of the new media platforms are behind 
financial paywalls, requiring monthly or annual fees.198  Since 76% of newspapers 
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have switched to paid service, 199 it is very likely that most media companies will 
eventually adopt a similar strategy.  Unlike the advertising-supported model of 
broadcasting that existed for nearly a century, much of the original programming and 
news content published online is moving behind paywalls and further limiting access 
to a significant population.200  “Thus, those who might benefit the most from good 
internet access – and its ability to provide access to jobs, education, and knowledge 
– may be the least likely to have it.  This ‘digital divide’ is well-documented.”201 
Information access is a recognized fundamental right,202 and that public policy 
has transformed the role of the Internet into an essential service.  Efforts have been 
made by Congress through the Telecommunications Act of 1996 to narrow this 
gap.203  Among the goals, all providers of telecommunications services are expected 
to “make an equitable and nondiscriminatory contribution to the preservation and 
advancement of universal service”204  and provide “specific, predictable and 
sufficient Federal and State mechanisms to preserve and advance universal 
service.”205  These public policy goals will not be met merely by helping fund the 
price of the broadband service, but must also expand to address the cost of the 
paywalls for news, entertainment, and cultural services. 
As a result of the shift from free, public media to pay-walled online content, the 
purpose of the Telecommunication Act’s universal service requirements needs to be 
expanded to include a funding strategy to provide the content that makes the Internet 
so valuable.  “The case for a robust universal service program is even stronger in the 
digital age.  As more of our daily activities move online, it becomes increasingly 
important to make sure that all consumers can continue to participate in society and 
benefit from the information revolution.”206  
B. Prohibition of Digital Redlining 
Also embedded in the universal service requirements are obligations to provide 
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the telecommunication services in “an equitable and nondiscriminatory” manner.207  
At first blush, the transition of media from broadcast television to the Internet should 
reduce rather than increase the risk of discriminatory programming.  After all, a UHF 
broadcaster serving a small geographic market may select programming based on the 
stereotypes associated with that geographic region, excluding minority populations.  
In contrast to this hypothetical, the Spanish language broadcaster Univision is the 
only broadcast network to show market growth in 2018 because it can leverage its 
terrestrial broadcast with streaming and other platforms.208 
Nonetheless, there is a significant risk that the ability to track the individual 
consumers on internet-based devices could lead to market segregation based on 
discriminatory practices under various state and federal laws.209  Targeting or 
withholding services based on race, color, national origin, sex, religion, familial 
status, physical or mental disability, age, sexual orientation, military or veteran’s 
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status, genetic information, or use of public subsidies are all identifiers that can be 
applied in an illegal and discriminatory fashion.210 
There is a long history of using both discriminatory and facially neutral data to 
further racial discrimination.211  Known as “redlining,”212 this practice is now illegal, 
but it is still not uncommon.213  It originated with the Home Owners’ Loan 
Corporation (HOLC), the predecessor of the Fair Housing Administration,214  which 
later became part of U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).215  
“HOLC appraisers divided cities into neighborhoods and developed forms which 
were distributed to real estate professionals . . . [incorporating] ‘notions of ethnic and 
racial worth’ utilized by real estate appraisers.”216   Expanding on the redlining 
practices of the HOLC, the Fair Housing Administration used lot size, setbacks, 
single-dwelling rules, and professional estimates to set a policy that devalued urban 
communities and prized suburban developments in a systematic practice that 
strongly disadvantaged African-American home owners.217  “Foremost among the 
variables considered by the [Fair Housing Administration] appraisal were the 
location of the property and the racial composition of the surrounding 
neighborhood.”218 
Eventually, of course, Congress passed Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 
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1968, later known as the Fair Housing Act.219  Enforcing the Fair Housing Act 
(FHA), HUD reversed its policy, and eventually it became a champion for fair 
housing.  Through congressional expansion and court decisions, overt racism has 
been reduced.220 
In early 2019, HUD sued Facebook for violations of the FHA precisely because 
it facilitated ad buyers targeting “audiences that included or excluded certain races, 
religions, or genders.”221  Earlier cases of internet-based housing discrimination had 
mixed results.  In Chicago Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. 
Craigslist, Inc., the Seventh Circuit applied Section 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act to the ads posted by users of the craigslist service.222  Craigslist had no 
editorial role and did not write any of the ads itself.  The court explained that 
“[n]othing in the service craigslist offers induces anyone to post any particular listing 
or express a preference for discrimination . . . [and if] craigslist “causes” the 
discriminatory notices, then so do phone companies and courier services.”223  In 
contrast, Roomates.com was not protected by Section 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act because it did much more than simply post the advertisements provided 
by the public.  In Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. 
Roommates.com,224 the service required parties seeking roommates to fill out a 
questionnaire that enabled site users to discriminate on matters of sex, sexual 
orientation, and family status of the roommate.  “Roommate’s own acts – posting the 
questionnaire and requiring answers to it – are entirely its doing and thus section 230 
of the CDA does not apply to them.”225  
Today, digital tracking technology can do far more to find the answers to the 
questions asked in the Roomates.com questionnaire.  Databases that cross-reference 
a person’s online activities, physical movements, purchasing history, and charitable 
giving can create profiles that are highly predictive for many of the race, sex, 
nationality, sexual preference and other categorizations.  And—while most 
advertisers are primarily concerned with age, sex, wealth, and geographic 
information—the other criteria will enable the advertiser to focus its ads on target 
populations and withhold those ads from individuals who do not meet the 
advertiser’s target audience.  Since it is a violation of the FHA to advertise for a 
“whites only” apartment complex,226 it should similarly be a violation for advertisers 
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to discriminate by using their a promotional budget to target likely white customers 
but not purchasing ads distributed to African American or Hispanic customers.227 
Access to housing is just one example of the potential for digital redlining.  
Billions of dollars are spent by pharmaceutical companies on advertising each 
year.228  A study from back in 2005, before the explosion in pharmaceutical 
television ads, focused on magazine ads.229  The study found that “readers of African 
American and Hispanic magazines were exposed to proportionally fewer health-
promoting advertisements and more health-diminishing advertisements.  
Photographs of African American role models were more often used to advertise 
products with negative health impact than positive health impact, while the reverse 
was true of Caucasian role models.”230  
As a consequence, the targeting of minorities in advertising likely plays a 
contributing factor for poorer health outcomes.231  “An extensive literature on 
television, radio, print, and Internet ads has examined the ways in which the food 
industry targets minority audiences.”232  To the extent that outdoor advertising can 
be used to target particular populations, the patterns are clear:  “communities at 
highest risk of obesity, low-income Latinos and African-Americans, had the highest 
density of unhealthy food and beverage ads.  Disparities were present also in low-
income neighborhoods, regardless of race, and in multiracial neighborhoods, 
regardless of income.”233  The only advertising more specifically targeted than 
neighborhood outdoor ads are targeted behavioral ads. 
For broadcast, the FCC has regulations requiring the disclosure of payments for 
advertising, when those ads are not self-evident.234  They are primarily designed to 
restrict the practice of payola, or paying programmers to promote certain songs on 
radio or particular content on television.235  These rules, however, do not control the 
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placement of the advertising or create any obligation to provide the same economic 
opportunity to acquire goods and services to all consumers equally.  The national 
nature of most broadcast networks and the lack of sophisticated targeting technology 
has meant that the FCC has not addressed redlining in the context of television 
broadcasting.  The FCC has received a complaint about redlining in the context of 
cable service speeds against AT&T, supported by a study provided by the National 
Digital Inclusion Alliance, highlighting concerns about disparate treatment in the 
delivery of services.236 
As noted by the Supreme Court, “[i]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, 
not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.”237  Once advertising is made 
available to the public, the civil rights that protect against discrimination can be 
reasonably balanced against what is only an economic burden to include the public 
equally rather than to target in a discriminatory fashion.238 
Targeted media and advertising are often supported by complex algorithms.239  
As consumers watch media and interact with commercial products through online 
engagement and commercial transactions, the data collected is used to build 
individual customer profiles used to select and highlight the next set of promoted 
products and services.240  The goal for content providers is to maximize market 
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share,241 and the goal for advertisers is to maximize revenue.242  As algorithms 
become faster, the scale grows larger, and the potential for secondary effects of 
criteria are left unstudied.  These tools can also promote discriminatory practices.243  
A.I.-powered systems have a dark side.  Their decisions are only as good as the data 
that humans feed them.  As their builders are learning, the data used to train deep-
learning systems isn’t neutral.  It can easily reflect the biases—conscious and 
unconscious—of the people who assemble it.  And sometimes data can be slanted 
by history, encoding trends and patterns that reflect centuries-old discrimination.244 
In a recent example, Apple has been accused of gender bias involving its credit 
card, issued by Goldman Sachs.245  Goldman Sachs disputes that it collects sex 
information or marital status, but acknowledges that it downgrades the significance 
of credit cards for applicants who are the secondary holder on the account.246  This 
potentially neutral choice means that the second spouse on a particular credit card—
historically, often the wife—will not be counted as a full credit partner on that card.  
The choice regarding the valuation of secondary cards is not inherently 
discriminatory, but the impact will be noticeable and significant.  It illustrates the 
decision making that often occurs and the types of digital redlining that is already 
taking place. 
As the primary national media producers move into unregulated cyberspace, the 
potential for far greater harm only grows.  Targeted, discriminatory marketing 
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already exists.  In the future, integrating customer tracking with these discriminatory 
practices could yield a much costlier, and potentially deadlier outcome.  
Recently, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) highlighted the ongoing 
practices of consumer tracking.247  As part of the 2019 Black Friday shopping season, 
the FBI issued a warning stating “[b]eyond the risk that your TV manufacturer and 
app developers may be listening and watching you, that television can also be a 
gateway for hackers to come into your home.”248  The FBI highlighted that many 
new smart TVs include microphones and built-in cameras.249  
“In some cases,” the warning explained, “the cameras are used for facial 
recognition so the TV knows who is watching and can suggest programming 
appropriately.”250  The use of these devices is premised on the exploitation of the 
audience member’s behavior and viewing information.  Mobile devices also have 
cameras, microphones, and similar capabilities to add surveillance to the consumer 
profile. 
Advertising targeted at taking advantage of a particular audience, such as 
minors, has been regulated by the FCC and may constitute a deceptive or unfair 
practice under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act).251  The 
advertisers might also run afoul of the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule.252  
The FTC has also taken action in the past to stop deceptive advertisements targeted 
at children, including the ballerina doll who could not dance on her own,253 the toy 
helicopter that did not actually fly,254 or the horse that could not stand up.255  But 
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these cases are relatively rare and do not necessarily relate well to the unregulated 
broadcast of entertainment content that play as little more than program-length 
commercials which fall under the jurisdiction by the FCC for broadcast television.256  
There are no similar rules for online platforms, so Amazon Prime can run hours of 
children’s programming featuring program-length commercials with embedded “buy 
now” buttons driving purchasing behavior on the Amazon Toy Store component of 
the marketplace. 
In the context of digital redlining, the FTC needs to do much more.  At a 
presentation before the American Bar Association, FTC Commissioner Rohit Chopra 
noted the problem.  “Outsized power in the tech market has invited scrutiny about a 
panoply of problems, from mass surveillance to digital redlining to the decline of 
journalism.”257  The FTC must take actions that recognize the use of algorithms that 
discriminate, product placements that are selected on the basis of race and other 
inappropriate qualifiers, and behavioral advertising that is designed to provide 
separate and inequal treatment; all of which constitute unfair and deceptive trade 
practices that violate the FTC Act.258  This leadership will also help empower the 
states to treat these trade practices as illegal under the state versions of the unfair and 
deceptive trade laws.259 
Whether the practice is focused on children, minorities, or other groups, the 
examples of advertiser misconduct are sufficiently robust to make this an ongoing 
concern.  Additional risks also exist, such as the media companies selling the 
behavior information to insurance companies and employers to be used to make 
underwriting decisions or hiring decisions.  While most content regulation may be 
overreaching, the basic antidiscrimination policies that already exist in state and 
federal law need to be explicitly incorporated into regulations governing the practices 
for online media.  For most of the harmful behavior, this can be done through 
additional FTC guidance on its existing advertising policies.  For certain other areas, 
however, such as the facilitation of housing discrimination and other forms of 
discrimination of public accommodations, Congress will need to revise the section 
230 of the CDA to reflect the modern nature of the Internet. 
C. Regulating Intrusions into Privacy 
As noted in the previous section, many of the concerns about digital redlining 
often start with the exploitation of personal data, highlighting the concerns about the 
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unregulated use of consumer information.  But the concerns about intrusion into 
privacy extend to all consumers, not just those who may fall within protected 
classifications under state or federal law. 
Both advertisers and content creators desire to know as much about their 
audiences as possible.260  Integrating microphones, cameras, GPS, biometrics, IoT 
enabled products, and facial recognition into the devices used to consume content 
has the potential to strip away almost all notions of privacy.  It is not too fanciful to 
imagine that heart rate monitoring technology integrated into wearable devices 
(including smartwatches, headphones, or other wearables) can be tied to the 
consumption of adult content to inform producers which passages have the most 
immediate salacious impact, as well as to report on the extent to which the consumer 
fast forwards videos and flips past the pages of the content that furthers the plot in 
search of the next moment of titillation.261   The days of finding the dirty passages in 
Lady Chatterley’s Lover by checking for dog-eared pages are long gone.262  Sellers 
of fast food, alcohol, cigarettes, lottery tickets, and casino visits could carefully 
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monitor their targets to assure that the optimal mix of direct advertising, product 
placement, and social media promotions enable the advertisers to know precisely 
how best to reshape public behavior.  At a minimum, updated regulations should 
make such tracking subject to opt-in consent requirements and public disclosures. 
The expansion of media consumption on tracking devices should trigger an 
understanding that the historical model of sectoral data privacy policy is inadequate 
to address the systemic issue involved in tracking a global population.263  Instead, as 
has been highlighted elsewhere, the value of privacy should be characterized as a 
public good.264  While each of these products and services are legal to sell to adults, 
the public bad caused by optimizing public policy to thwart regulation will lead to 
poor health outcomes and other social costs that will be shouldered by all of society, 
not just the individual consumer.  
The laissez-faire alternative would allow the marketing firms an unregulated 
hand to track, target, and incentivize its customers to abuse alcohol and smoke their 
lungs out.  The employers, insurance companies, and municipalities who shoulder 
the costs for these destructive behaviors, would be equally free to apply the same 
technologies and tactics to exclude these people from the workforce and the 
employment pool.  Government could deny public benefits based on the same 
tracking.  To finish the laissez-faire model, zip-code and other demographic tools 
would be added to the hiring and coverage models to squeeze out those individuals 
who are associated as likely candidates for unhealthy behavior, which would 
generally result in another form of digital redlining.  Neither of these outcomes is 
socially desirable.  
While this example may seem farfetched, it has been well-documented that a 
variety of technologies are being used by U.S. and foreign governments to increase 
surveillance.265  It is naïve to believe that these agencies would not use the content 
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of media as an additional criteria in their surveillance or that the private sector will 
refrain from making the same efforts.  Governments, private contractors, and 
commercial vendors could all have reasons to track the public based on personal 
viewing content in particular languages and dialects; a person downloading or 
streaming documentaries promoting specific ideological perspectives; or a person 
making positive comments on social media tied to broadcast content.  In the absence 
of a legitimately issued warrant, such intrusions should not be sanctioned. 
The broader issues of privacy in the United States are beyond the scope of this 
article.  There are unique aspects of traditional media distribution, however, that 
reflect a subset of privacy practices.  For example, Congress passed the Video 
Privacy Protection Act of 1988266 to prohibit the sharing of “prerecorded video 
cassette tapes or similar audio visual material.”267  The law was extended to some 
online streaming services.268  In actions against Cartoon Network and CNN, courts 
have distinguished between a subscriber or renter of a streamed video with those who 
watch content without first subscribing.269  In denying standing, the court found that 
allegations of watching video clips online were insufficient to receive protection 
under the statute.270 
The Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988 was further weakened by a 2013 
amendment that added a consent provision, enabling rental and streaming companies 
to obtain written consent to collect and share the record history and viewership 
information.271  The change had been requested by Netflix, which wanted to create 
an ability to promote social exchanges around shared viewing habits.272 
Although there are no similar federal laws for public libraries, the majority of 
states provide statutory protection from the disclosure of reading histories.273  Media 
content consumption reflects the raw material from which the development of 
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political ideas and free speech are formed.  To track a person’s reading or viewing 
history has a significant potential to chill speech.274  It has been true in print and in 
the video store.  It is just as true for the online content consumer.  This theoretical 
concern is backed by empirical data that “supports the protection of reader and 
viewer privacy under many of the theories used to justify First Amendment 
protection.”275  It has also been understood by the Supreme Court. 
 [T]he State may not, consistently with the spirit of the First Amendment, contract 
the spectrum of available knowledge.  The right of freedom of speech and press 
includes not only the right to utter or to print, but the right to distribute, the right to 
receive, the right to read, and freedom of inquiry, freedom of thought, and freedom 
to teach—indeed the freedom of the entire university community.276 
The right to free speech necessarily includes the right to create content and the 
right to consume content.277  If the right to receive information has meaning, it should 
not be subject to warrantless searches by the government nor commercial 
exploitation without consent provided in a meaningful manner that cannot be easily 
thwarted through click-wrap agreements, changed unilaterally by ISPs, or made the 
condition of access to content.278 
The right to review, listen, and view content is a fundamental right.  It must be 
treated as such and provided federal protection that expands on the original 
protections in the Video Privacy Protection Act to include all content consumers 
(rather than merely subscribers and renters), to use a broad definition of personal 
information, and to make the opt-in consent meaningful, non-conditional, and fully 
revocable.  
D. Promoting Diversity of Viewpoint and Content in the Public Interest Through 
Expanded Antitrust Enforcement and Increased Public Support for News, 
Educational, and Cultural Content 
The proliferation of online content suggests that concerns over diversity of 
viewpoint have disappeared, but this may not be the case.  Congress has remained 
committed to diversity and public interest.279  Because of social media and the 
increased ease to produce podcasts and videos, the production of content has 
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exploded.280  Further, the stark demarcations among content producers, advertisers, 
and audiences have been eroded through the development of transmedia and social 
media platforms.281  
Nonetheless, while the bottleneck for the production of media has diminished, 
the competition for audience scale has only increased.  Actual media concentration 
has increased considerably, especially with the introduction of Netflix, Amazon 
Prime, Apple and Google serving both to create original content and to distribute the 
content of others.282  Ownership concentration and advertising chokepoints raise 
concerns about the nature of the content available to the public.283  The cost of 
promoting a studio-produced movie provides an excellent example: 
Hollywood continues to wrestle with rising marketing costs, particularly 
overseas, which can make up 70 percent of a film’s gross thanks to booming markets 
in Russia, Latin America and Asia.  Two years ago, the cost had crept up to $175 
million globally. Now, studios say it has hit the $200 million mark per picture . . . . 
In 1980, the average cost of marketing a studio movie in the U.S. was $4.3 million 
($12.4 million in today’s dollars).  By 2007, it had shot up to nearly $36 million.  If 
the MPAA still tracked spending on P&A, that number would be north of $40 million 
today for medium-size films like The Fault in Our Stars or Tammy.284Unlike the 
early days of radio, the digital marketplace does not suffer from static and 
interference.  But the competition for the attention of the audience creates a different 
kind of interference that can be solved only through massive advertising investments 
or the power of media influencers.285  Both these approaches are focused on selling 
                                                                                                     
 280.  See NYC MEDIA & ENTERTAINMENT, NEW YORK CITY, THE PODCASTING CAPITAL, 
http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/mome/pdf/MOME_PODCAST_REPORT_Web_Final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/22AY-HSCG] (last visited Oct. 30, 2020) (As of 2016, “Apple, the platform through 
which the majority of podcasts are downloaded, has over 350,000 active podcasts, with 13 million 
episodes of audio and video content.”); Bob Woods, The Podcasting Revenue Boom Has Started, 
STRATEGY+BUS.:  TECH & INNOVATION (Oct. 18, 2018), http://www.strategy-business.com/article/The-
Podcasting-Revenue-Boom-Has-Started?gko=d3034 [https://perma.cc/A33Y-F479] (“[T]he audience 
has attained critical mass. . . . Simultaneously, the podcast universe has exploded to more than 500,000 
shows, and the quality of the content and production values have gone up, as well.”). 
 281.  See Ross, supra note 260, at 158 (“For media and communication theory, then, the opportunity 
for audiences to act as mass communicators represents a blurring of production and reception, social 
settings typically conceived as interdependent but separate.”). 
 282.  See Ashley Lutz, These 6 Corporations Control 90% of the Media in America, BUS. INSIDER 
(June 14, 2012), http://www.businessinsider.com/these-6-corporations-control-90-of-the-media-in-
america-2012-6?IR=T [https://perma.cc/X89Q-RMJZ] (“In 1983, 90% of US media was controlled by 
50 companies; as of 2011, 90% was controlled by just 6 companies . . . . In 2017, the number was also 
6.”). 
 283.  Google is particularly of concern in this regard, since it remains primarily an advertising 
company that hosts content to drive ad sales.  See J. Clement, Advertising Revenue of Google from 2001 
to 2019, STATISTA, (Feb. 5, 2020), http://www.statista.com/statistics/266249/advertising-revenue-of-
google/ [https://perma.cc/Q7FT-SFAZ] (“In 2019, advertising accounted for the majority of Google’s 
total revenue, which amounted to a total of 160.74 billion U.S. dollars.  In the most recent fiscal period, 
advertising revenue through Google Sites made up 70.9 percent of the company’s revenues.”). 
 284.  Pamela McClintock, $200 Million and Rising: Hollywood Struggles with Soaring Marketing 
Costs, HOLLYWOOD REP. MAG. (July 31, 2014, 5:00 AM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news 
/200-million-rising-hollywood-struggles-721818 [https://perma.cc/7YMH-3QNL].  
 285.  See Vivian Wagner, The Power of Influencer Marketing, E–COMMERCE TIMES (Apr 5, 2019, 
5:00 AM), https://www.ecommercetimes.com/story/85939.html [https://perma.cc/YSD4-S75A] 
(“‘Influencer marketing is one of the fastest-growing marketing channels today,’ said digital strategist 
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audiences to the highest bidder. 
For the same reasons, the market power of the media conglomerates does raise 
some concerns.  For example, when Jeff Bezos, founder of Amazon, purchased the 
Washington Post, there were concerns about the exploitation of the newspaper to 
further a tech-industry agenda.286  Bezos has been circumspect about his role in the 
paper, but the economic control remains troubling.287  
There are two discrete governmental approaches to these concerns—expanding 
FTC enforcement of antitrust principles and increasing support for publicly funded 
education, news, and cultural programming.  
The first is to expand antitrust enforcement, with the FTC paying particular 
attention to the potential of a future merger or consolidation which tends to lessen 
competition among those enterprises that produce the top seventy to eighty percent 
of consumed content.288 
The market segmentation rules of the Communications Act and 
Telecommunications Act have become increasingly weak barriers to media 
concentration.289  As recently summarized by the Third Circuit, “[b]y preventing any 
one entity from owning more than a certain amount of broadcast media, these rules 
limit consolidation and promote a number of interests, commonly stated as 
                                                                                                     
Shane Barker.  ‘It involves leveraging social media influencers or key leaders to get more people to trust 
your brand,’ he told the E-Commerce Times.”); Rory Cellan-Jones, Tech Tent: The Power of 
Influencers, BBC NEWS (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-47001461 
[https://perma.cc/98Y4-Z3BT] (Werner Geyser, founder of the Influencer Marketing Hub, asserted “that 
there was an average earned media value of $5.20 per dollar spent.”  “That earned media value turns out 
to include something as nebulous as ‘increasing brand awareness,’ but Mr Geyser insists companies do 
see real returns in the form of extra sales.”). 
 286.  See Jack Shafer, What Does Jeff Bezos Want?, POLITICO (Apr. 18, 2018), 
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/04/18/jeff-bezos-amazon-washington-post-217994 
[https://perma.cc/3WBL-3UCW] (“By retaining both the editor and the editorial page editor he 
inherited, Bezos has maintained the basic course plotted by the Post’s previous owners, the Graham 
family.  He’s also kept his nose out of news coverage, which has delighted journalists . . . .”). 
 287.  See id.; Alex Shephard, The Other Side of Jeff Bezos’s Washington Post, THE NEW REPUBLIC 
(June 27, 2018), https://newrepublic.com/article/149404/side-jeff-bezoss-washington-post 
[https://perma.cc/LAL5-6BF5] (“Since Amazon CEO Jeff Bezos purchased The Washington Post in 
2013, the newspaper has been one of the great—and few—success stories in media, legacy or 
otherwise.”). 
 288.  See Howard A. Shelanski, Antitrust Law As Mass Media Regulation: Can Merger Standards 
Protect the Public Interest, 94 CAL. L. REV. 371, 374 (2006) (“[P]olicy makers concerned with 
preserving competition and diversity in media markets should supplement their attention to deregulating 
media ownership with attention to improving the effectiveness of antitrust enforcement in deregulated 
media markets.”). 
 289.  See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202(h), 110 Stat. 56, 111-12 
(reducing cross-ownership regulations and directing the FCC to review media ownership rules to 
determine whether they are “necessary in the public interest as a result of competition,” and to “repeal or 
modify any regulation it determines to be no longer in the public interest”); see also 47 CFR § 73.3555 
(2020) (regulations on cross-ownership and multiple ownership).  See generally 2014 Quadrennial Reg. 
Rev.—Rev. of the Comm’n’s Broad Ownership Rules & Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 
of the Telecomms. Act of 1996, Second Report and Order, 31 FCC Rcd. 9864 (2016), vacated and 
remanded, Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 939 F.3d 567 (3rd Cir. 2019); Fox TV Stations, Inc. v. 
FCC, 280 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
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‘competition, diversity, and localism.”290  Nonetheless, even before the FCC faces 
loss of control over media distributors, it has abandoned this approach for most 
purposes.291  Since this Article has stressed that the FCC will lose its jurisdictional 
ability to impose these regulations on companies not involved in over-the-air 
broadcasting, the loss of anti-competition rules has only a short-term public harm.  If 
anything, the continued enforcement of these rules might have motivated companies 
to abandon their over-the-air broadcasting earlier, such that their repeal may have 
some limited benefit. 
It remains, however, that the FCC action has placed most antitrust and anti-
competition issues in the hands of the FTC.  Fortunately, the FTC does not base its 
jurisdiction on the scarcity doctrine or the public interest of the airwaves.  Instead, 
the FTC bases its regulation on the Sherman Act,292 FTC Act,293 and the Clayton 
Act.294  There is ample space within the traditional jurisdiction of the FTC to address 
the accumulation of market power achieved as a result of media industry 
consolidation and its negative impact on the ability for new entrants to purchase 
sufficient advertising and influence to gain market share.  There is also an 
opportunity for the FTC to look more carefully at the negative impacts of tying 
arrangements,295 which had once been unlawful per se296, but now require that the 
seller have appreciable market power.297  The market power of the media companies 
and the companies operating the two largest app stores have significant power to 
                                                                                                     
 290.  Prometheus Radio Project, 939 F.3d at 573 (reviewing the FCC’s diversity initiatives and 
broadcast media ownership rules). 
 291.  Order on Reconsideration, supra note 141, at 9802 para. 2.  The action ended a century of 
cross–ownership policies designed to promote diversity of viewpoint: 
Specifically, we (1) eliminate the Newspaper/Broadcast Cross-Ownership Rule; (2) 
eliminate the Radio/Television Cross-Ownership Rule; (3) revise the Local Television 
Ownership Rule to eliminate the Eight-Voices Test and to modify the Top-Four Prohibition 
to better reflect the competitive conditions in local markets; (4) decline to modify the 
market definitions relied on in the Local Radio Ownership Rule, but provide a presumption 
for certain embedded market transactions; (5) eliminate the attribution rule for television 
joint sales agreements (JSAs); and (6) retain the disclosure requirement for shared service 
agreements (SSAs) involving commercial television stations. 
Id. 
 292.  Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, ch. 647, §§ 1-2, 26 Stat. 209, 209 (current version at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1-2) (Section 1, prohibiting unreasonable restraints of trade; and Section 2, prohibiting the 
monopolization, attempted monopolization, and conspiracy to monopolize). 
 293.  Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 717, 719 (current version at 15 
U.S.C. § 45) (prohibiting unfair and deceptive trade practices). 
 294.  Clayton Act of 1914, ch. 323, §3, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 14) 
(prohibiting anticompetitive sales conditions and practices). 
 295.  See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 462 (1992) (explaining that a 
“tying arrangement is ‘an agreement by a party to sell one product on the condition that the buyer also 
purchases a different (or tied) product, or at least agrees that he will not purchase that product from any 
other supplier’”). 
 296.  Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 9 (1984) (“It is far too late in the history 
of our antitrust jurisprudence to question the proposition that certain tying arrangements pose an 
unacceptable risk of stifling competition and therefore are unreasonable ‘per se.’”), abrogated by Ill. 
Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006) (eliminating presumption of monopoly power 
for patented product). 
 297.  PSI Repair Servs., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 104 F.3d 811, 815 n.2 (6th Cir. 1997); see also Ill. 
Tool Works, Inc., 547 U.S. at 38-40. 
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promote a particular media product or to bury it beyond the reach of the ordinary 
consumer.  If a media host features an app, game, or movie, it jumps to the top of the 
public’s attention.298  If it does not show up early in the search results, most 
consumers will go elsewhere.299  The advice given to developers to be featured on 
the app stores is to incorporate the tools of the platform’s developer and to be 
interactive with all versions of the platform developer’s products.300  If it is a 
requirement to be featured on the Apple App store that the proposed app must work 
on iPhones, iPads, and Apple Watches, then perhaps the market share and tying 
requirements are met.  
As media content moves to app marketplaces on Roku, Amazon Fire, and similar 
devices, the potential to throttle or prioritize content for noncompetitive purposes 
becomes increasingly likely.  When these issues arose in broadcast and cable, 
Congress adopted must-carry rules to protect the public from similar anti-
competitive behavior and to promote content diversity and localism.301  The FTC 
must be prepared to take similar steps using the regulations under its jurisdiction.  If 
the FTC determines that these competitive games are not barred by existing 
regulations, then Congress should act to protect the public from uncompetitive 
behavior among the media conglomerates to continue to promote content diversity. 
The second strategy to promote viewpoint and content diversity is for federal 
and state agencies to fund free educational and cultural content, and to support the 
nonprofit sector in these efforts.  As empirical research demonstrates:  
 [B]roadcasting subsidies create better informed . . . [and] more equally informed 
citizens. . . . [Public broadcasters] focus on goals other than attracting the largest 
audience and provide more political coverage.  This in turn creates higher levels of 
political knowledge among viewers of public broadcasting and works to blunt 
knowledge variations created by differences in class . . . and political interest.302   
                                                                                                     
 298.  See Top 10 Ways to Get Your App Featured in the App Store, CLEARBRIDGE MOBILE, 
https://clearbridgemobile.com/top-10-ways-to-get-your-app-featured-in-the-app-store/ 
[https://perma.cc/7TDZ-3FFT] (last visited Oct. 30, 2020) (“Everybody wants to be featured in the App 
Store.  A spot on Apple’s feature page is a powerful way to boost traffic, increase visibility and drive 
downloads.  With over 2 million apps available in the App Store today, the competition for getting 
noticed by editors is aggressive.”). 
 299.  See id. 
 300.  See Deepak Abbot, How to Get Featured on the App Store Today, GROWTH BUG (Sept. 1, 
2018), https://growthbug.com/how-to-get-featured-on-the-app-store-today-tab-19ed37cf5afc 
[https://perma.cc/2S2S-2H6V] (“Apple doesn’t pick up apps randomly. . . . [P]aid apps, or apps with in-
app purchases, are more likely to be featured, especially if those apps have high ratings and are available 
for other Apple products, such as the iPad or the Apple Watch.”); App Hacks: How to Get Your Android 
App Featured on the Google Play Store, INSTABUG BLOG, https://instabug.com/blog/android-app-
featured-google-play/ [https://perma.cc/EUK4-WA2A] (last visited Oct. 30, 2020) (“Google releases 
tons of products each year at Google I/O, such as Firebase and Google Maps SDKs, for developers to 
make use of them. . . . Google tends to feature strong apps using these new technologies as a way of 
validating their own innovations.”). 
 301.  See 47 U.S.C. § 534(b)(1)(B) (2018); Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622, 630 
(1994). 
 302.  Patrick O’Mahen, A Big Bird Effect? The Interaction Among Public Broadcasting, Public 
Subsidies, and Political Knowledge, 8 EUR. POL. SCI. REV. 311, 312 (2016) (“[P]ublic broadcasters that 
rely on government subsidies can break out of the shareholder-profit model embraced by commercial 
broadcasters.  This consistent revenue stream allows them to focus on goals other than attracting the 
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Through additional empirical research, it has been demonstrated that high 
quality public media broadcasts both increased the public’s general interest in 
becoming better informed and increased the willingness to watch media representing 
a more diverse set of political viewpoints.303  High quality educational programming 
and programming addressing cultural interests not captured by the commercial 
market promote diversity of viewpoint and an informed citizenry.  These results 
reinforce the congressional findings that serve as the basis for the Corporation for 
Public Broadcasting: 
 (1) it is in the public interest to encourage the growth and development of public 
radio and television broadcasting, including the use of such media for instructional, 
educational, and cultural purposes; 
 (2) it is in the public interest to encourage the growth and development of 
nonbroadcast telecommunications technologies for the delivery of public 
telecommunications services; 
 (3) expansion and development of public telecommunications and of diversity of 
its programming depend on freedom, imagination, and initiative on both local and 
national levels; 
 (4) the encouragement and support of public telecommunications, while matters of 
importance for private and local development, are also of appropriate and important 
concern to the Federal Government; 
. . . 
 (9) it is in the public interest for the Federal Government to ensure that all citizens 
of the United States have access to public telecommunications services through all 
appropriate available telecommunications distribution technologies; and 
 (10) a private corporation should be created to facilitate the development of public 
telecommunications and to afford maximum protection from extraneous 
interference and control.304 
The nature of content produced for public radio and public television are often 
quite different than the commercial content produced by the media conglomerates.  
The nonprofit content producers have the ability to emphasize children’s 
programming and programming designed to address traditionally underserved 
communities.  While some of the content is similar to commercial productions 
(particularly during pledge drives), these broadcasters have the ability and the 
mandate to address the public interest without the commercial pressures that exist 
                                                                                                     
largest audience and provide more political coverage.”); see also Karen Donders, Public Service Media 
Beyond the Digital Hype: Distribution Strategies in a Platform Era, 41 MEDIA, CULTURE & SOC’Y 1011 
(2019); Laia Castro-Herrero et al., Bridging Gaps in Cross-Cutting Media Exposure: The Role of Public 
Service Broadcasting, 35 POL. COMMC’N. 542 (2018). 
 303.  Castro-Herrero et al., supra note 302, at 553. 
[M]edia systems with strong PSB facilitate access to politically balanced news information, 
and spread standards of political diversity across media outlets.  This increases the 
opportunities for less motivated individuals to encounter cross-cutting information without 
actively searching for it and have an equalizing effect on the level crosscutting exposure 
between more and less politically interested individuals. . . . Our findings thus complement 
cross-national studies showing that lower news media fragmentation and greater news 
reach provide citizens with abilities and motivations conducive to all forms of news media 
exposure.  
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 304.  § 396(a)(1)-(4), (9), (10). 
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among the commercial ventures. 
These efforts do nothing to discourage the commercial marketplace and they fall 
well within the promotional powers of Congress and the states.305  The government 
has a long history of providing financing to support arts, education, and culture 
without running afoul of any First Amendment limitations.306  The Supreme Court 
has made clear that “government has broad discretion to make content-based 
judgments in deciding what private speech to make available to the public.”307 
As the government reduces its involvement in the regulation of broadcast 
content and monetizes the frequencies dropped from broadcast,308 Congress should 
move to set aside these funds as a trust for funding noncommercial content rather 
than merely providing yet another subsidy to the media conglomerates that have 
benefitted from the public interest revenue for so many generations.309 
An additional benefit of an endowed trust is that it enables federal and state 
funding while separating the decisions about spending the funds from the vagaries 
of congressional politicking.310  It creates a long-term, sustainable model for 
nonprofit and public-sector arts, news, and media organizations to help foster the 
diversity of viewpoint and informed citizenry essential to a healthy nation. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite many concerns, the Internet is in ascendance as the primary platform for 
distribution of news, films, television, radio, podcasts, games, social media, and 
other forms of cultural content.  Technological innovation continues to expand the 
availability for the content on home and mobile devices.  As this technology 
continues to evolve, the historical reliance on the broadcast spectrum for radio and 
television will increasingly be eclipsed. 
Over-the-air broadcasting once had many benefits, but the advent of new 
technologies, the limitations of over-the-air broadcasting and the scarcity of the 
bandwidth spectrum made this platform increasingly obsolete.  From a historical and 
regulatory perspective, however, it was precisely the nature of the airwaves that gave 
                                                                                                     
 305.  See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 953 (2018) (National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities); 20 
U.S.C. § 954 (2018) (National Endowment for the Arts). 
 306.  See, e.g., United States v. Am. Libr. Ass’n., Inc., 539 U.S. 194 (2003) (funding for public 
libraries); Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998) (upholding cash grants awarded 
to artists). 
 307.  Am. Libr. Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. at 204. 
 308.  See 47 U.S.C. § 1452 (2018) (“The Commission shall conduct a reverse auction to determine 
the amount of compensation that each broadcast television licensee would accept in return for 
voluntarily relinquishing some or all of its broadcast television spectrum usage rights in order to make 
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 310.  See Nat’l Endowment for the Arts, 524 U.S. at 574 (“Throughout the NEA’s history, only a 
handful of the agency’s roughly 100,000 awards have generated formal complaints about misapplied 
funds or abuse of the public’s trust.  Two provocative works, however, . . . led to congressional 
revaluation of the NEA’s funding priorities and efforts to increase oversight of its grant–making 
procedures.”). 
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rise to the FCC and many of its jurisdictional powers.  Particularly with regard to 
media protected by the First Amendment, only the scarcity of the airwaves (and the 
cable bandwidth that came after) provided the Commission its ability to regulate in 
the public interest, requiring diversity of viewpoint that sometimes veered into the 
compelled airing of content adverse to the position of the broadcaster. 
The changes in economics and technology are driving media producers to the 
Internet, and eventually, they will shed their historical connections to over-the-air 
broadcast.  As each company leaves the over-the-air broadcasting sphere, the FCC 
loses much of its regulatory authority over that company.  
Nonetheless, there are compelling government interests in a healthy media 
environment, and some of these efforts can withstand constitutional scrutiny without 
reliance on the scarcity doctrine.  To promote the public interest of diversity of 
viewpoint, Congress should expand funding for news, educational content, and 
cultural content—building on what it has done over the past century.  The FTC must 
step into the void created by the FCC’s departure, enforcing both the FTC Act’s 
provisions to assure that online advertising, customer privacy, and COPA protections 
are rigorously enforced.  The FTC must also reexamine the nature of the online 
transactions to better reflect the Sherman Act and Clayton Act provisions of antitrust 
regulation as it applies to this new model of media distribution. 
There were many lessons learned by the FCC during the law’s development 
from the Radio Act through the Communications Act and into the 
Telecommunications Act.  The media has changed but the audience has not.  These 
lessons are essential if the next century of telecommunications policy will be able to 
help usher in another golden age and avoid the creation of an online media wasteland.  
The transition from over-the-air broadcasting to an entirely online experience 
has not occurred.  But policy makers understand the days of broadcast are numbered.  
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